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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code§ 78-2a-3(h) (1953 as amended) and Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
as this is an appeal from an order entered in a domestic relations case 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
FIRST ISSUE: Appellant/Respondent's (hereinafter Mr. Johnson) First Issue 
claims the trial court erred in finding that the real property located at 1892 East Deep 
Woods Drive, Draper, Utah 84020 was Appellee/Petitioner 's (hereinafter Ms. Castillo) 
separate property and despite Mr. Johnson's asserted efforts and financial contribution 
did not become marital property. This First Issue is a mixture of law and fact. 
Standard of Review, A "clearly erroneous" standard of review applies to a 
challenge of the adequacy of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1994; Kelley v. Kelley, 
2000 UT App 236, % 18, 9 P.3d 171, 177-178. A "clear abuse of discretion" standard of 
review applies to the trial court's equitable distribution of marital and personal property. 
Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 83, \ 17, 45 P.3d 176, 180; citing Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 
at 602. 
SECOND ISSUE: Mr. Johnson's Second Issue claims the trial court ruled on 
insufficient evidence when it ordered Ms. Castillo to be reimbursed $10,000.00 for her 
payment of Mr. Johnson's medical bills. This Second Issue is a mixture of law and fact. 
Mr. Johnson seeks a remand claiming the facts in the record are not clear. Mr. Johnson is 
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not entitled to a remand on purported "unclear facts" where he had the burden of 
presenting his case at trial and failed to do so. 
Standard of Review, A "clearly erroneous" standard of review applies to a 
challenge of the adequacy of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 603; Kelley, 9 P.3d at 177-178. A "clear abuse of discretion" 
standard of review applies to the trial court's equitable distribution of marital and 
personal property. Elman, 45 P.3d at 180; citing Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 602. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Constitutional Provisions, Statutes and Rules are relevant to this 
appeal: 
Statutes: 
Utah Code § 30-3-5(1) (1953 as amended) 
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include 
in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts 
or obligations, and parties. . . 
Rules: 
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) 
A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal seeks review of the finding of the trial court that the real property and 
all appreciation was Ms. Castillo's separate property thus denying Mr. Johnson a share of 
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its appreciation during the marriage, asking as relief that the order of the trial court be 
reversed and that Mr. Johnson receive an equal distribution of the appreciation of the real 
property during the marriage. Mr. Johnson also challenges the trial court's order 
reimbursing Ms. Castillo $10,000.00 in medical expenses she paid on Mr. Johnson's 
behalf claiming the facts in the record are unclear and that the appellate court should 
remand the case to the trial court. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A Restraining Order was issued against Mr. Johnson permanently restraining him 
from coming to Ms. Castillo's residence. R. at 17-181 
A bifurcation Decree of Divorce granting a decree of divorce and reserving all 
other issues was entered on April 21, 2005. R. at 371-373 
An Order Pursuant to Motion for Temporary Orders was entered on May 2, 2005 
ordering, among other things, that both parties be restrained from the use of illicit drug of 
any kind and/or alcohol within eight (8) hours of being in the presence of the child; and 
that each party submit to random drug testing for a period of ninety days (90) from the 
beginning of testing for drug or alcohol, and including a hair follicle test. R. at 388-393 
The trial of this matter commenced on May 3, 2006 at which time the trial court 
directed questioning to Mr. Johnson regarding his failure to complete the previously 
ordered drug testing. Tr. at 15: 21-25; 16: 1-16. The trial court asked Mr. Johnson if he 
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was currently using controlled substances and Mr. Johnson denied that he was. Tr. at 16: 
17-19. Mr. Johnson was sworn under oath and the trial court again asked him if he had 
been using drugs. Mr. Johnson admitted that he had used an opiate two days prior to 
trial. Tr. at 16: 17-25; 17: 1-12 The trial court ordered the administration of a drug test 
on Mr. Johnson, Tr. at 17: 13-19, and the test of Mr. Johnson proved positive for two 
controlled substances. Tr. at 21: 7-20. The trial was continued to May 9, 2006. 
The trial again convened on May 9, 2006 at which time Mr. Johnson's drug test 
proved negative. Tr. at 36: 6-9; 39: 14-15 At the request of Mr. Johnson's counsel Ms. 
Castillo was also administered a drug test which proved negative. Tr. at 44: 7-25; 45: 1-
23; 52: 1-3 
Final arguments and the Court's ruling took place on July 6, 2006. R. 631-635; 
669; Transcript of Hearing. Rec. 465; 762; Tr. at 191-218 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree and 
Judgment Resolving All Issues and Permanent Mutual Protective Order R. 723-747 were 
entered September 25, 2006. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed on October 11, 2006 R. 748-479 The case was 
selected for mediation, but was not resolved. 
1
 There will be two separate citations to the Record on Appeal in this Brief. The court 
record of pleadings and papers shall be referred to as "R. page number." The Transcript 
of Proceedings shall be referred to as "Tr. Page number." 
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RELEVANT FACTS WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD 
Ms. Castillo submits the following relevant facts as a supplement to those itemized 
in Mr. Johnson's Brief. 
Ms. Castillo was severely burned at the age of four years while a passenger in a 
vehicle. Another passenger lit firecrackers and threw them around. The interior of the 
car ignited and Ms. Castillo suffered extensive burns. Another child who was also a 
passenger died as a result of his injuries. Tr. at 20: 9-25; 21: 1-5. 
Counsel for Ms. Castillo proffered testimony of Ms. Castillo 's mother, Linda 
Crandall, Tr. at 25: 2-25; 26; 27: 1-13 and Ms. Crandall testified about how the injuries 
occurred. Tr. at 28: 3-25; 29: 1-3 Ms. Crandall testified regarding the settlement 
proceeds received by Ms. Castillo for her injuries which included a trust for her medical 
and schooling in addition to an annuity which generated monthly payments. Tr. at 29: 4-
23 Ms. Crandall testified that the balance remaining in the medical trust at the time of 
trial was about $500,000 plus an additional sum of no less than $200,000. Tr. at 30: 3-18. 
Ms. Crandall testified regarding the extent of Ms. Castillo's medical treatments after 
receiving her injuries, Tr. at 30: 19-25; 31: 1-4, estimating that Ms. Castillo had 
undergone at least 70 or 80 surgeries plus other small ones. Tr. at 31: 5-6. Ms, Crandall 
testified regarding the medical procedures which Ms. Castillo needed in the future as 
planned surgery and that her medical needs to deal with the scarring would go on for the 
rest of her life, Tr. at 31: 9-18 Ms. Crandall testified on cross examination that Ms. 
Castillo had not had surgery in about nine years. Tr. at 33: 1-16 
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Ms. Castillo testified that she was not currently able to obtain hospital, medical 
insurance and that she has significant, ongoing, lifelong medical expenses. Tr. at 151: 
19-25 Ms. Castillo testified that she had more surgery planned but had postponed it until 
after the divorce trial was resolved because of the negative effects of stress on her ability 
to heal as well as the hindrance to have tissue expanders and go out in public. Tr. at 152: 
1-15 
During cross examination of Ms. Castillo the trial court inquired whether she was 
able to work. Ms. Castillo answered no and that she had only had one job and had been 
laid off. In answer to the trial court's questions Ms. Castillo stated that the reason for the 
loss of the job was because of her bums, that the job was in retail and some customers 
had made some remarks. Tr. at 160: 12-21 
At the conclusion of Ms. Castillo's testimony the trial court asked her about her 
need for future surgery, the amount of associated pain, and that a number of different 
surgeries would be needed. Tr. at 168: 20-25; 169: 1-8 
Mr. Johnson testified that he had not been employed since prior to his marriage to 
Ms. Castillo and that he had not been employed since the marriage. Tr at 78: 5-25. He 
testified that he was going to start a job on the Monday after the trial. Tr. at 79: 1-2 Mr. 
Johnson's counsel proffered Mr. Johnson's testimony that he was in pain after being in 
the automobile crash in August, 2002, that Ms. Castillo had told him she didn't want him 
to go back to work, and that the parties agreed that he would be a stay-at-home dad. Tr. 
at 117: 15-25; 118; 119: 1-10. Mr. Johnson testified that Ms. Castillo didn't want him to 
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work and that she wanted him to take care of her and take care of the child when he was 
born. Tr . a t l l9 : 11-21 
In addition to the short quotation of the trial court at the argument and ruling 
referred to in Mr. Johnson's Brief, the court recited in detail the factors upon which its 
decision was based and the reasoning in which the court engaged in arriving at its 
conclusion in the Amended Findings of Fact R. 727-728, ff 11, 12] and Conclusions of 
Law R. 734-735, fflf 30, 31 and Amended Decree and Judgment Resolving All Issues and 
Permanent Mutual Protective Order R. 723-747. Expressions of the court's reasoning are 
also found in the Trial Transcript Tr. at 200-209 and in the court's direct comments to 
each of the parties. Tr. at 216-217 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The challenged error is the trial court's finding that all mortgage principal and 
interest payments came from Ms. Castillo's separate funds. The finding at issue is not 
clearly erroneous when all of the facts and circumstances are considered. Any error in 
the finding was harmless as, based upon the uncontroverted facts, the Court's decision 
would have been the same. 
There was no misapplication of the law by the trial court when it concluded that 
Mr. Johnson acquired no equitable interest in the subject real property. The trial court 
heard the testimony, considered the evidence and proffers, evaluated and determined that 
Mr. Johnson's claims that he contributed to the enhancement of the subject real property 
and rendered child care were insufficient to support any equitable award to him of any 
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portion of the appreciation of the subject real property which may have accrued during 
the two year marriage. 
Mr. Johnson disputes the trial court's finding that the subject real property 
remained Ms. Castillo's separate property during the marriage, argues that there was 
commingling, contribution, or gifting to Mr. Johnson, but Mr. Johnson fails to marshal 
the evidence in support thereof. 
The trial court did not misapply the law when it awarded all appreciation to Ms. 
Castillo. The general rule in Utah is that premarital property plus all appreciation should 
be awarded to the spouse who owned it prior to marriage. There are exceptions to the 
general rule which have justified a trial court's award of a spouse's separate property to 
the other spouse under appropriate circumstances. Mr. Johnson did not raise any claim 
at trial that he should be awarded some of Ms. Castillo's separate property in order that a 
fair, just and equitable result be obtained between the parties and should not be allowed 
to raise the claim for the first time on appeal. 
Mr. Johnson asserts on appeal that he was entitled to an equal distribution of the 
appreciation of the real property because the appreciation during the marriage was marital 
property. On that presumption, Mr. Johnson then attempts to marshal the evidence of 
Ms. Castillo's physical disabilities and medical needs attempting to show that she was not 
entitled to more than an equal portion of the appreciation. Mr. Johnson's claim is 
unavailing if he fails to persuade this court that the trial court erred in denying him any 
equitable interest in the subject property and, alternatively, in the event the appreciation 
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of the subject real property were found a marital asset, the facts in the record sufficiently 
support the trial court's award. 
Mr. Johnson is not entitled to a remand on the issue of the award of $10,000.00 to 
Ms. Castillo as reimbursement for her payment of Mr. Johnson's medical expenses. Mr. 
Johnson had the burden of persuasion at trial regarding the disposition of his personal 
injury settlement proceeds and had access to all documentation and evidence pertaining 
to when his personal injury claim arose, when his surgery occurred, and when and how 
much was paid for the surgery. Mr. Johnson failed to present any documentary evidence 
to the court to establish the facts he now claims are unclear. Mr. Johnson should not be 
awarded a second bite at the apple to present evidence he could have produced at the trial 
of the matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
APPRECIATION IN THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY WAS MS. 
CASTILLO'S SEPARATE PROPERTY 
The findings and conclusions of the trial court are generally upheld: 
"A trial court has considerable discretion concerning 
property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its 
actions enjoy a presumption of validity. " 
Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). We disturb a trial court's property 
division and valuation "only when there is 'a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion." Id. (quoting Noble v. Noble, 
761 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Utah 1988)). 
Elman, 45 P.3d at 180. 
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The trial court is in the prime position to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
In reviewing such a claim [challenge to court's 
findings of fact] we give due regard "to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
the witnesses,", and we do not set aside a challenged 
finding except when we determine it to be clearly 
erroneous Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
Schaumberg, 875P.2dat603 
The principal witnesses in the case at hand were the parties. The trial court had its 
first opportunity to hear testimony on May 3, 2006. The Respondent, Mr. Johnson, was 
the first witness called to the stand. The trial court inquired whether he was currently 
using controlled substances. Mr. Johnson denied that he was. Tr. at 15: 21-25; 16: 1-22. 
After Mr. Johnson was sworn under oath and under further questioning by the court he 
admitted using drugs two days before the trial. Tr. at 16: 20-25; 17: 1-19. The Court 
ordered Mr. Johnson to undergo a drug test which proved positive for cocaine and 
opiates. Tr. at 21: 7-20. The trial was continued until May 9, 2006 at which time Mr. 
Johnson was again tested for drugs and tested negative. Tr. at 36: 6-9; 39: 14-15. At the 
request of Mr. Johnson's counsel Ms. Castillo underwent drug testing which proved 
negative. Tr. at 44: 7-25; 45: 1-22; 52: 1-2. 
Under questioning from the court Mr. Johnson testified that his dings of choice 
were cocaine and meth but asserted that he had not taken any meth for almost two years. 
Tr. at 72: 21-25; 73: 1-10. He later testified that he also used Ecstasy and marijuana. Tr. 
at 128: 5-18 The court inquired whether Mr. Johnson was going to AA and suggested 
that he go to three meetings per week. Tr. at 1-22. On May 9, 2006 the trial judge asked 
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Mr. Johnson's counsel to proffer what Mr. Johnson had done between the first date of 
trial and the second date regarding attending AA meetings. The responsive proffer was 
that he had attended one meeting. Tr. at 120: 22-25; 121: 1-16. Mr. Johnson testified on 
redirect examination that he used the family credit card to pay for his drug use. Tr. at 
125: 10-24. He then testified that he was allowed $300 every two weeks as a set 
allowance and that he paid for drugs out of his allowance. Tr. at 237: 1-22. Mr. Johnson 
testified in answers to questioning from his counsel that Ms. Castillo had introduced him 
to drugs. The trial court stated that even though he was trying to put the blame on her he 
was the one who was using. Tr. at 130: 3-10. The court noted an inconsistency in his 
testimony at Tr. 130: 11-15. 
Mr. Johnson did not know the address of where he had been living for five 
months. Tr. at 75: 23-25; 76: 1-25; 77: 1-10 He was able to recall the apartment number 
and that it had two bedrooms. Tr. at 82: 9-19 Mr. Johnson's mother was paying half of 
the $690.00 per month rent but did not live in the apartment. Tr. at 83: 1-14 
Mr. Johnson had not been employed since before his marriage to Ms. Castillo on 
October 4, 2002. Tr. 78 at 5-25; 86: 24-25; 87: 1-8; Rec. 1 He testified that he had 
recently obtained a job which was scheduled to begin the Monday after the trial. Tr. at 
79: 1-4 In response to the court's inquiry as to why he didn't work, Mr. Johnson testified 
that he "wasn't allowed to work" Tr. at 103: 23-25; 104: 1-15 Mr. Johnson testified that 
he and Ms. Castillo had an agreement that he would be a stay-at-home dad until the child 
was in kindergarten. Tr. at 116: 1-11. Ms. Castillo denied any such agreement. Tr. at 
154: 8-23 The court observed that Mr. Johnson hadn't seen the child since the separation 
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and that he still wasn't working and that it seemed to the court that he just didn't like to 
work. Tr. at 120: 8-23. 
Since the separation of the parties on October 19, 2004, Rec. 1; Rec. 31, Mr. 
Johnson had been cited for "alcohol reckless" and his driving license was suspended for 
90 days. Tr. at 86: 14-23 He also had been charged with DUI in a road rage altercation 
during which his arm had been broken, Tr. at 128: 19-25; that he had a history with drug 
use and alcohol, Tr. at 129: 4-6; and that he had spent 27 days in jail. Tr. at 129: 9-12. 
Mr. Johnson testified that he believed he was entitled to an equal share of the real 
property because he married Ms. Castillo, Tr. at 99: 9-24; that he had provided the money 
to pay for the landscaping from his personal injury settlement proceeds, Tr. at 99: 25; 
100: 1-2; 108: 10-25; 109: 1-25; 110: 1-25; 111: 1-15; that he had installed tile in the 
house, Tr. at 100: 3-25; 101: 1-25; 102: 1-7; and that $3,000.00 of the personal injury 
settlement proceeds were supposed to go into the house for mortgage payments, Tr. at 
106: 17-25 
Mr. Johnson testified that he had been the primary care giver for the minor child of 
the parties. Tr. at 112: 5-8 Ms. Castillo denied this. Tr. at 150: 9-25 The court observed 
that both parties were at home taking care of the child, Tr. at 113: 23-25; and challenged 
Mr. Johnson's counsel's proffer from other witnesses that Mr. Johnson was doing it 
solely. Tr. at 114: 2-25. The subsequent testimony from Mr. Johnson's former brother-
in-law showed limited observations of claimed child care. Tr. at 135-139: 1-13 The 
court observed that Mr. Johnson had not seen the child for 15 months, Tr. at 115: 5-15. 
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The trial court had ample opportunity to observe the credibility and truthfulness of 
Mr. Johnson as a primary witness in the case. 
The trial court appropriately followed the instructions of the appellate courts in 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) to first categorize the property 
as separate property or marital property. Kelley, 9 P.3d at 179. 
A. Mr. Johnson has Failed to Adequately Marshal the 
Evidence 
Mr. Johnson itemizes only those portions of the Record which support his desired 
conclusion and only those portions which deal with the narrow purported error in fact. 
He fails to satisfy the requirements expressed by the Court in Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT 
App 12 If 24, 973 P.2d 431, 437 that he "present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings 
the appellant resists" 
For instance, Mr. Johnson did not include in his exercise of marshalling the 
evidence the following pertinent uncontroverted facts: 
1. The closing on the purchase of the subject real estate by Ms. Castillo was on 
February 24, 2003. Addendum 1 [Exhibit #11] 
2. The date of the separation of the parties was October 19, 2004. Addendum 2 
[Rec. 1, Petition for Divorce; Rec. 31, Answer and CounterPetition] 
3. A deposit of $4,420.42 into Ms. Castillo's separate account (#1827028) on 
September 20, 2004 from her annuity payor. Addendum 3 [Exhibit #16, p. 152] 
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4. A deposit of $5,452.88 into Ms. Castillo's separate account on September 30, 
2004 from her annuity payor; and payment of $3,005.97 to GMACM for the real estate 
mortgage principal and interest on September 29,2004. Addendum 3 [Exhibit #16, p. 
155] 
5. Withdrawal Transfers totaling $4,000.00 were made to the joint bank account 
(#1939679) on September 3,2004 [$500.00] Addendum 3 [Exhibit #16, p. 149]; 
September 9,2004 [$2,600.00] Addendum 3 [Exhibit #16, p. 151]; September 10, 2004 
[$500.00] Addendum 3 [Exhibit #16, p. 151]; September 27, 2004 [$200.00] Addendum 
3 [Exhibit #16, p. 154]; and September 29, 2004 [$200.00] Addendum 3 [Exhibit #16, p. 
155]. 
6. Withdrawal Transfers totaling $2,350.00 were made to joint bank account 
(#1939679) on October 12,2004 [$400.00] Addendum 4 [Exhibit #16, p. 157]; October 
15,2004 [$200.00] Addendum 4 [Exhibit #16, p. 158]; two transfers on October 20, 2004 
[$250.00 and $500.00] Addendum 4 [Exhibit #16, p. 158]; two transfers on October 21, 
2004 [$200.00 and $300.00] Addendum 4 [Exhibit #16, p. 158]; October 26, 2004 
[$500.00] Addendum 4 [Exhibit #16, p. 159]. 
7. Draft #701 for $ 11,237.50 from the separate account. Addendum 4 [Exhibit 
#16, p. 157] 
8. Final Account Statement (#1939679) dated November, 2004. Addendum 5 
[Exhibit #17, p. 186] 
9. Wasatch Landscaping & Sprinklers bid proposal. Addendum 6 [Exhibit 15, p. 
124] 
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10. Proffer by Respondent's counsel during testimony of Respondent [Tr. at 112: 
15-25; Tr. at 113: 1-9] 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: No, we're not dealing with custody issues, Your Honor, but 
the law clearly states that one of the determinations of splitting equity in any home 
is the contributions made by the family and it clearly states child care is one of the 
issues in the cases from the Court of Appeals. I believe it's Dunn v. Dunn. 
THE COURT: You'd have to show me that. I don't believe for one minute that if 
one party chooses not to work and chooses to stay home, that that counts -
Mr. SCHOFIELD: Your Honor, it's in our trial brief. I believe it's Dunn vs. 
Dunn that says actually that when determining something as marital property, that 
financial situations shouldn't even be considered. What should be considered is 
love, companionship, child care and homemaking, It says it clearly in Dunn vs. 
Dunn. Our contention is that there was an agreement between the parties, not 
while she was pregnant but -
THE COURT: That's what he said. 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: - - but raising the child. Can I ask him a question about that? 
11. Further proffer by Respondent's counsel during testimony of Respondent [Tr. 
at 121: 21-25; Tr. at 122-123; Tr. at 124:1-17] 
THE COURT: But I don't understand how that's relevant. You claim it means he 
has an equity position in the house. 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: - -1 think that the definition of marital property is property 
that's purchased during the marriage. I mean, we're not saying that we want to 
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take her down payment on it but this property was certainly, it was purchased 
during the marriage. 
THE COURT: If it was purchased during the marriage but all payments come 
from her, the down payment and the title is in only her name, then I think there's a 
real question, a legal question. 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: And we would defer to the case law that we've given you 
because we believe that it doesn't matter how that comes about. It it's marital 
property, it has to be split equitably and -
THE COURT: Never co-mingled the money that went into the house. 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: We're not saying we want any - we believe that she should get 
her down payment back. Our only position, Your Honor, is we believe that he 
should have the equity in this house. We think he's entitled to that. 
THE COURT: That would mean I'd treat it as a marital asset and I'm saying, I 
don't see how I can. Apart from his claim which is unsupported that he put tile in 
and his claim that money he contributed was used for landscaping which, of 
course, he'd be entitled to recover, I don't see that he's contributed anything to the 
house and if he had, his name would have been listed on the title. 
Mr, SCHOFIELD: Again, Your Honor, and I can only defer and I wish I could 
look up the case right now but in Dunn vs. Dunn it talks about -
THE COURT: I'll read it again. 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: And it talks about the financial contributions of the family 
shouldn't even be a factor because that takes away from love, companionship, 
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child care and household services. I mean "Facts which Courts may consider in 
considering distribution of marital property do not include consideration of which 
partner was more economically productive during the marriage. Such analysis 
ignores contributions of love, encouragement and companionship which allude 
[sic] monetary valuation and give 
THE COURT: Dunn vs. Dunn involved a wife who didn't work, right? 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And it was sort of the reverse scenario and it involved a situation 
where the husband had been the worker bee. In this case no one was the worker 
bee, right? 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: Yes, but I think it clearly states that the financial contributions 
- - if it's bought during the marriage - - the very definition of marital property our 
contention is, property that was purchased during the marriage. 
THE COURT: That isn't sufficient. I know the law does not say that, that if it's 
bought during the marriage then automatically it's the marital asset. That isn't a 
law. It may be certainly one large factor to consider but not every instance in 
which property is acquired during the marriage, if it's especially acquired with 
funds that were generated before the marriage, becomes a marital asset. 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: But I think that's common. I mean, if you have a businessman 
that has a wife that doesn't work, I mean, they make the payments and they are the 
only one on the title. Like I said we're not saying that he's entitled to her down 
payment but we certainly think that -
17 
THE COURT: How do you think he's entitled to half the equity? 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: Yes, we do. That's correct. 
THE COURT: That's the question. 
Mr. SCHOFIELD: Okay. Thank you Your Honor. I don't have any further 
questions for him. 
The trial court considered many other facts in addition to the payment of the 
mortgage principal and interest from Ms. Castillo's separate funds. The single fact 
challenged on appeal is not a fatal flaw. 
B. The Challenged Finding is Not Clearly Erroneous Under 
All of the Facts and Circumstances 
Mr. Johnson claims that the trial court erred in a finding of fact found within 
paragraph 11 of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court's 
finding pertained to the real property purchased by Ms. Castillo in Draper, Utah during 
the marriage of the parties. 
The real property situated at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, 
Draper, Utah, 84020 was purchased by Petitioner from her 
separate, pre-marital funds and assets. Title to said real 
property was taken by Petitioner individually. Respondent 
was never included or named as an owner on the title to said 
real property. Petitioner was the sole applicant of and obligor 
on the obligation which encumbers the real property. All 
payments of the mortgage principal and interest were made 
by Petitioner from her separate funds. All payments of the 
real property taxes and insurance were made by Petitioner 
from her separate funds. 
R. at 727. 
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The only finding contained within paragraph 11 disputed by Mr. Johnson states: 
"All payments of the mortgage principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her 
separate funds." 
Mr. Johnson testified that $3,000.00 of his total $27,682.35 personal injury 
settlement payment was withheld and not deposited into Ms. Castillo's separate account 
and that it was to go to the home, into the mortgage. Tr. at 106: 17-25. Mr. Johnson 
failed to produce any documentary evidence to support his claim that the $3,000.00 was 
paid to the mortgage lender. Ms. Castillo testified that the funds were deposited into the 
separate account because Mr. Johnson "put it there". Tr. at 155: 10-16; and denied that 
the $3,000.00 was used to pay the mortgage on the house. Tr. at 153: 11-22 
Mr. Johnson commingled his separate personal injury settlement proceeds with 
Ms. Castillo's separate funds by depositing the $24,682.35 in her separate bank account 
on September 11, 2004, approximately one month prior to the separation of the parties. 
Mr. Johnson's thrust at trial focused upon tracing the use of his separate personal injury 
settlement proceeds into the landscaping for the subject real property. 
Ms Castillo's bank account activity shows consistent and adequate funding to 
cover all mortgage principal and interest payments. Her separate account showed a 
beginning balance on September 1, 2004 of $6,644.47 and during the months of 
September and October, 2004, Addenda 3 and 4, Ms. Castillo received other deposits to 
her separate account from receipt of her annuity payments ($9,873.30 each month) and a 
transfer in September, 2004 of $5,500.00 from her savings account. In addition to paying 
all other household bills and expenses in September and October, 2004, Ms. Castillo 
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transferred $4,000.00 during September and $2,350.00 during October to the joint bank 
account she had with Mr. Johnson, issued checks for $7,632.50 and $11,237.50, amounts 
similar to those shown on the landscape bid proposal, Addendum 6, and made one 
$3,005.97 payment to GMACM, the mortgage lender. The parties separated on October 
19,2004. Addendum 2 
Mr. Johnson asserts that the alleged error, "[a]ll payments of the mortgage 
principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds.", overrides all of 
the other undisputed facts in the case and mandates a reversal of the trial court's finding 
that said real property was Ms. Castillo's separate property, did not become marital 
property, and that Mr. Johnson's efforts did not entitle him to an equitable interest so as 
to justify awarding him any portion of the appreciation in value of the real property 
during the period of the marriage. 
In challenging the adequacy of the findings made by the trial court, Mr. Johnson 
must show that the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. Elman, 45 P.3d at 180: 
Kelley, 9 P.3d at 177. The facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the findings. 
Id., at 178. 
An analysis of the separate bank account activity, Addenda 3 and 4. during 
September and October, 2004, in the light most favorable to the findings, shows that Mr. 
Johnson's personal injury settlement proceeds were applied towards payment of the 
amounts associated with the landscaping bid proposal, Addendum 6, and transferred into 
the joint bank account rather than applied towards the one and only mortgage principal 
and interest payment made in the relevant time period. 
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The trial court had only the conflicting testimony of Ms. Castillo and Mr. Johnson 
regarding the disposition of the $3,000.00, and was in the best position to weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses and their testimony. Therefore the finding of the trial court 
that "All payments of the mortgage principal and interest were made by Petitioner from 
her separate funds." cannot be construed as being clearly erroneous. 
Mr. Johnson does not dispute any of the other facts found by the trial court in 
Paragraph 11 of the Amended Findings of Fact which are adequate in and of themselves, 
exclusive of the disputed fact, of supporting the finding and ruling of the trial court. 
C. Mr. Johnson has Failed to Demonstrate Any Substantial 
and Prejudicial Error and No Serious Inequity Has 
Resulted 
Even if it were to be concluded that the specific fact "[A]ll payments of the 
mortgage principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds" is 
erroneous, the trial court's finding that the appreciation of the real property during the 
marriage did not become marital property is not against the clear weight of the evidence 
upon which the ruling is based nor does it result in a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 602; Marchant v. Marchant 1AZ P.2d 
199, 203 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) [trial court's failure to make proper findings is harmless 
error only if facts clearly support only a finding in favor of the judgment]. An error such 
as challenged herein does not rise to the level contemplated by the Court of Appeals: 
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting 
evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to 
21 
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting 
upon the evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Moon, 973 P.2d at 437. 
This specific finding of fact is harmless and Mr. Johnson has failed to demonstrate 
how the alleged error affected the outcome of the proceedings. 
"Harmless error is defined . . . as an error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 
796 (Utah 1991)(quotations and citations omitted). "Put in 
other words, an error is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine our 
confidence in the verdict." Id. "On appeal, the appellant has 
the burden of demonstrating an error was prejudicial - - that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings." Steffensen v. Smith fs Mgmt. 
Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(quotations 
and citation omitted), aff'd. 862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, f 21, 80 P.3d 553, 558-559 
Mr. Johnson's thrust at trial was that the subject real property should be 
considered to be a marital asset because it was purchased when he was married to Ms. 
Castillo, that he acquired an equitable interest in the real property through his investment 
of "sweat equity" into it in the form of overseeing the landscaping, overseeing the 
installation of a home theater, and installing tile. He further argued that he contributed 
child care, love, companionship, and homemaking. Finally, he argued that his monetary 
contribution of $27,682.00 derived from his personal injury settlement that he attempted 
to trace into payments for the landscaping mandated a ruling from the trial court that the 
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subject property became marital in nature and that he was entitled to share in the 
appreciation of the asset during the marriage of the parties. 
On appeal Mr. Johnson asserts that because of the trial court's error in expression 
the order and ruling of the trial court should be reversed. Mr. Johnson has failed to 
demonstrate, in view of all of the other uncontroverted evidence, how any substantial and 
prejudicial error has been made or that any serious injustice or inequity has resulted from 
the alleged technical error in expression. Elman, 45 P.3d at 180; Covey, 80 P.3d at 558-
559. 
i. Mr. Johnson's Claimed "Sweat Equity" Was Not 
Supported by the Evidence. 
Mr. Johnson presented no testimony or documentary evidence to establish that his 
one time financial contribution one month prior to the separation of the parties adequately 
enhanced the value of the premarital asset of Ms. Castillo thus constituting an exception 
to the general rule that premarital property plus all of its appreciation would be returned 
to the party who owned it. He failed to present any credible evidence to support his claim 
that he enhanced the value of the subject real property through his "sweat equity" in the 
form of overseeing the landscaping and was thus entitled to an equitable interest in the 
appreciation of the subject real property. He called no witness from the landscaping 
company or elsewhere to corroborate his claimed efforts. Mr. Johnson presented no 
testimony or evidence to show that his claimed efforts in any way enhanced or 
contributed to the value of the subject property. See, Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116,118 
(Utah CtApp. 1990) 
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Mr. Johnson presented no documentary evidence to support his claims that he 
performed "sweat equity" on the subject property that enhanced its value by overseeing 
the installation of the home theater. Mr. Johnson did not testify, offer evidence, or 
present other witness testimony to corroborate his claim that his efforts in any way 
enhanced or contributed to the value of the subject property. See Id. 
Mr. Johnson testified that he installed slate tile, Tr. at 100: 3-23, and his sister 
testified that she was with Mr. Johnson when he did tile work in the house. Tr. at 174: 
20-25; 175: 1-3. Tr. at 100: 23-24; 101: 1-25; 102: 1-4 Ms. Castillo testified that she 
paid for the slate tile from her separate account and paid a third party from her separate 
account to install the slate tile. Tr. at 144: 20-25; 145: 1-8; 166: 10-11 Mr. Johnson gave 
no testimony and offered no evidence, or other witness testimony that his efforts in any 
way enhanced or contributed to the value of the subject property. See Id. 
ii. Mr. Johnson's Claim That $3,000.00 Went to 
Mortgage Payments is Not Supported by the 
Evidence 
Mr. Johnson testified that $3,000.00 was withheld from the amount deposited into 
Ms. Castillo's separate bank account on September 11, 2004 and was used to pay the 
mortgage. Tr. at 106:17-25 Ms. Castillo denied this. Tr. at 153: 11-19 Mr. Johnson did 
not present any documentary evidence to support his claims regarding the use of the 
$3,000.00. The trial court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 603; Marchant, 743 P.2d at 202. 
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iii. Mr. Johnson's Claim That His Personal Injury 
Settlement Funds Went to Mortgage Principal and 
Interest Payments is Not Supported by the 
Evidence 
Mr. Johnson presented no documents or other evidence pertaining to the nature or 
the dates of his personal injury litigation, the settlement agreement, or the use of his 
personal injury settlement proceeds, relying only on the bank records which Petitioner 
offered as Exhibits #16 and #17. He claimed at trial that his personal injury settlement 
proceeds could be directly traced into the payments for the landscaping for the subject 
real property. The documentary evidence shows that two checks, Addenda 3 and 4, were 
written from Ms. Castillo's separate bank account in amounts which are similar to 
amounts shown on the landscaping bid proposal. Addendum 6 
For or the first time on appeal Mr. Johnson claims that $24,632.35 of his personal 
injury settlement proceeds should be construed as having been applied to the mortgage 
principal and interest payments on the subject real property for the sole reason that the 
funds were deposited into the account from which Petitioner made mortgage payments. 
The single deposit of Mr. Johnson's personal injury settlement funds into the separate 
account of Ms. Castillo on September 11, 2004 is not disputed. This deposit represented 
the only financial contribution from Mr. Johnson to the marriage during its stormy two 
year existence and occurred approximately one month before the separation of the 
parties. 
The activity within Ms. Castillo's separate account is uncontroverted that on 
September 15, 2004 a check for $7,632.50 appears, an amount which is approximately 
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the same as a payment acknowledged on the landscaping bid proposal. Addendum 6 On 
September 20, 2004 a deposit of $4,420.42 from Ms. Castillo's life time annuity was 
posted. On September 30,2004 another life time annuity deposit of $5,452.88 is 
reflected. On October 8, 2004 an additional check of $11,237.50, an amount which is 
approximately the same as an amount acknowledged on the landscaping bid proposal, 
appears on the bank records of the separate account. This check plus the September 15, 
2004 check for $7,632.50 total $18,870.50. Ms. Castillo also transferred $4,000.00 
during September and $2,350.00 during October to the joint bank account she had with 
Mr. Johnson, bringing the total to $25,220.50. Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the finding it is most likely that the dollars used to pay the mortgage 
principal and interest to GMACM of $3,055.97 on September 29,2004 came from Ms. 
Castillo's life time annuity deposits, and thus Ms. Castillo's separate funds were used to 
pay the mortgage principal and interest. Considering all of the facts and circumstances 
regarding the activity of Ms. Castillo's bank account at that point in time and viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, the finding of the trial court that "[A]ll 
payments of the mortgage principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her 
separate fimds" cannot be said to be clearly erroneous. 
iv. Mr. Johnson Has Failed to Meet His Burden to 
Show That the Court's Ruling Would Have Been 
Different Absent the Disputed Finding 
The uncontroverted facts and evidence, the testimony of the witnesses cited above, 
the various dialogue between the court and respective counsel during the trial, the direct 
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questioning of the parties by the court, and the ruling of the court clearly show that the 
outcome of the trial would not have been different: 
THE COURT: My understanding of the law is that if the 
property is kept separate, if there is no commingling of funds, 
etc., then it can remain her asset just as her settlement money 
is her asset and has nothing to do with him. Tr. at 200: 13-16 
THE COURT: And as you say, if it was in the bank, clearly 
it would be hers and I don't see any distinction in her putting 
it in a home. He had the benefit of living in the home, he 
made no house payments, he didn't work, he didn't pay the 
down payment or anything toward it and now he's seeking to 
get part of the money from the home. The only thing I'm 
interested in is if he can document in any way the tile work 
that he talked about and any other contribution. Tr. at 200: 
24-25; 201: 1-6 
THE COURT: There are no receipts for tile purchase, no 
testimony was given as to the exact number of hours worked 
or as to an agreement that he was to be paid for that work. Tr. 
at 208: 9-12 
THE COURT: I don't know that the money went for that and 
there's no document that shows that. There's no check, for 
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example, drawn on her account or any account for tile. Tr. at 
208: 17-20 
THE COURT: . . . [A]s I look at my notes from what 
testimony was educed [sic], the landscaping, I would be 
inclined to pay him back for that. It appears that the $24,000 
or whatever that was put into her account was used in part for 
landscaping. $10,000 of it was used for medical bills. Fm 
inclined to give him credit for $24,000 less $10,000 and that's 
all Fm inclined to give him credit for. Fll assume that the 
rest of it went to tile, and that's giving him the benefit of the 
doubt because there's no proof of that and the house goes to 
her. I find that it's been kept as a separate asset, his name is 
not on the title, it never was. He's never paid taxes, he 
couldn't qualify for the mortgage and she said, her testimony 
was that she paid $3,000 for tile but Fm going to give him the 
benefit of the doubt and give him back what he put in, the 
$24,000 into her account, less the $10,000 that went for 
medical bills. Tr. at 209: 5-21 
THE COURT: . . . All right. That winds everything up and I 
wish the parties the best of luck. 
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Frankly sir, I think that while you may not have gotten what 
you think you were entitled to, I think you've come out of this 
ahead of where you were to begin with. You had a place to 
live for a period ofyears rent free. You did not work. At best 
you laid some tile and I don't understand to this day why you 
did not work. I understand there was a child but I raised a 
child and worked at the same time. I did both without the 
assistance of anyone else and I don't understand why you 
couldn't work or why you were unable to get, or hold or to 
keep a job or look for a job and consequently, I cannot find 
you've made any contribution to the house other than the one 
lump sum that was from your personal injury settlement and 
$10,000 of that went to medical fees. So I think you've come 
out of this in a good position. Tr. at 216: 20-24; 217: 1- 11 
THE COURT: And ma'am, I think you're entitled to the 
equity for a variety of reasons. I think you kept the asset 
separate and as I said before, the title was never in joint 
tenancy. I think the testimony, as I recall, that you're going 
to need future surgery and that that money needs to be kept, 
your assets need to be retained to the extent legally possible 
so that you have the money for those medical bills in the 
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future and I've taken all of this into consideration in 
determining attorney's fees and the fact that each side will be 
paying their own and I've taken into account the history of 
the house in determining that it's an asset to be awarded to 
the Petitioner subject to one small payment to the 
Respondent. Tr. at 216-217 
Mr. Johnson has failed to demonstrate that the outcome at trial would have 
been different had the trial court omitted its finding that "[a]ll payments of the mortgage 
principal and interest were made by Petitioner from her separate funds" or restated its 
finding to acknowledge the facts and circumstances surrounding the sole deposit of Mr. 
Johnson's personal injury settlement funds into the separate account of Ms. Castillo. He 
has failed to demonstrate how this claimed error is substantial or prejudicial, or that any 
serious injustice or inequity has resulted. 
D. The Trial Court Did Not Misapply the Law in its Findings 
and Conclusions That the Subject Real Property was Ms. 
Castillo's Separate Property And That Mr. Johnson Did 
Not Acquire Any Equitable Interest in the Subject Real 
Property 
The general rule in Utah is that the trial court should award property acquired by 
one spouse by gift and/or inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in 
exchange thereof) to that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its 
value, unless (1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
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interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost through 
commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of an interest 
therein to the other spouse. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court heard all of the testimony of Mr. Johnson pertaining to his claims 
that he supervised the landscaping and home theater installation, installed slate tile, that 
approximately one month prior to the separation of the parties he made a financial 
contribution to the enhancement of the subject real property, and that he performed child 
care. The trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and 
their testimony. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 603; Marchant, 743 P.2d at 202. 
The ruling of the trial court is well within the parameters of the standards set by 
the appellate courts of the State of Utah. The Mortensen decision of the Utah Supreme 
Court which states the general rule in Utah contains an extensive analysis of the case law 
both in Utah and in other jurisdictions pertaining to equitable property division in divorce 
cases and in particular considered claims of augmentation and/or improvement of 
property which are similar in nature to the claim made by Mr. Johnson on appeal, stating, 
"[s]significantly, no case has been found where this Court has reversed a trial court's 
disposition of gifts or inherited property received by one party during the marriage." 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 307. Since Mortensen was decided in 1988 several additional 
scenarios have been reviewed by the appellate court. 
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) concerned dissolution of an 
11 year marriage between parties with no children. In Dunn the husband had established 
a professional corporation during the marriage, had invented a medical device which he 
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sold on contract with resulting royalty rights, and had retirement benefits which had 
accrued both prior to and during the marriage. The trial court categorized the property as 
separate or marital, but allocated a larger percentage of the marital property to the 
husband on the basis that the husband had contributed more to the marriage than had the 
wife. The appellate court remanded the case holding that the trial court had abused its 
discretion in its equitable distribution of marital property based solely on the parties' 
comparative economic contributions to the marriage. The appellate court remanded 
instructing the trial court to follow the systematic approach set forth in Burt, 799 P.2d at 
1171. 
Dunn is distinguishable from the case at hand on a number of grounds, but mainly 
because the issue in the instant case is the propriety of the trial court's determination that 
the subject real property was the separate property of Ms. Castillo and did not become 
marital property to which the general rule of an equal distribution between the parties 
would apply. 
The Dunn Court reversed the trial court's determination that credits for certain 
premarital assets should be granted. Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1321 The appellate court 
criticized a credit of $26,000 which had arisen out of a sale of a premarital airplane with 
the use of a portion of the sales proceeds as a down payment on another airplane, then 
payment of the ongoing installments from marital funds. The appellate court reversed on 
the grounds that such activity resulted in a commingling of the asset into a marital asset. 
Similarly, the appellate court reversed a $22,493 credit against equity in the marital home 
where the sales proceeds from the premarital condominium had been commingled into 
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the marital estate; and reversed a $8,700 credit for the value of a premarital vehicle as 
during the marriage the vehicle had been sold and the proceeds deposited into the joint 
bank account. 
In the instant case no corporations, patents of inventions, or royalty contracts or 
any other type of asset was created by either party during the marriage. No credits are 
claimed here for any premarital assets which were sold with proceeds deposited into a 
joint account or used as a down payment on an asset with installment payments coming 
from marital funds. Here the only commingling of separate property occurred when Mr. 
Johnson deposited the $24,682.00 proceeds from his separate property personal injury 
settlement into Ms. Castillo's separate bank account, coincidentally the account from 
which Ms. Castillo paid the mortgage principal and interest payments. The trial court 
tacitly acknowledged this as Mr. Johnson's separate property, capable of being traced, 
and ordered $ 14,000.00 of said sum to be returned to Mr. Johnson. 
Other than pointing to the absence of a prenuptial agreement as evidence of intent 
to contribute or commingle premarital property, no testimony or evidence was presented 
that Ms. Castillo intended to commingle any of her premarital assets with marital assets. 
To the contrary, Ms. Castillo testified at trial that she always intended that her personal 
property and bank accounts would remain her separate property, Tr. at 150: 1-8; and that 
she had no intention to contribute or gift any portion of the subject real property to Mr. 
Johnson. Tr. at 155: 25; 156: 1-5 
In 2002 the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's allocation between the 
parties as a marital asset the appreciation of a premarital asset which had accrued during 
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the marriage. Elman, 45 P.3d at 180-182. The Elman claim is similar to Mr. Johnson's 
claim for a share of appreciation of a premarital asset during the marriage, but the facts in 
Elman are distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. 
Here it is uncontroverted that Ms. Castillo used her separate pre-marital funds to 
make the down payment on the subject real property, then made ongoing mortgage 
payments as well as real property taxes and insurance from her separate checking account 
into which her ongoing life annuity payments and earnings from a pre-marital investment 
account were deposited. Mr. Johnson is claiming an equitable share of the appreciation 
of the subject real property which occurred during the marriage of the parties based upon 
the alleged but undocumented use of $3,000.00 of his personal injury settlement proceeds 
towards the mortgage, and the sole deposit, approximately one month prior to the 
separation of the parties, of his personal injury settlement proceeds into the bank account 
from which Ms. Castillo paid the mortgage. He also claims that he enhanced the subject 
real property through his efforts of supervising the landscaping and installation of a home 
theater and his installation of slate tile. 
In Elman the trial court categorized the property as separate or marital and found 
that the husband's valuable pre-marital partnership interests remained his separate 
property, that he had not commingled the partnership assets, and that the wife had not 
directly enhanced their value during the marriage. However the trial court did find that 
the wife had actively and uniquely managed and enhanced other marital property thereby 
enlarging the value of marital property as well as allowing husband to engage in activities 
which solely benefited his premarital property. The trial court found that as a result of 
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the wife's efforts in enhancing the marital estate and enabling the husband to concentrate 
on his premarital partnerships, the wife became equitably entitled to a small share of the 
appreciation on the husband's premarital assets. 
The appellate court in Elman affirmed the trial court and in doing so restated the 
general rule in Utah that after the trial court first categorizes the parties' property as 
marital or separate, then the trial court should generally award the property and the 
appreciation thereon to the spouse who brought the property into the marriage. Id. at 180, 
[citations omitted]. The affirmation of the trial court's decision in Elman is held to be 
consistent with and a proper application of the law set forth in xheDunn, 802 P.2d at 
1323, [a right to an equal share of marital property to a wife as a partner in the business 
of the marriage]; Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 603, [marital funds used to augment spouse's 
separate property]; Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 1983), [assumption of 
domestic burdens made husband's full-time participation in pre-marital corporation 
possible]; Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), [wife assisted in 
operation of corporation purchased with husband's pre-marital assets, plus performed 
domestic duties and reared children]. The ruling in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 
(Utah 1987) was distinguished, [no share of appreciation of a premarital asset is justified 
where appreciation was derived solely from inflation, and no evidence existed of the 
other spouse's contribution toward growth, or that the assets were accumulated or 
enhanced by the joint efforts of the parties]. 
In the instant case neither Ms. Castillo nor Mr. Johnson worked during the 
marriage. Ms. Castillo did not work because of serious and severe burns she suffered as a 
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child, Tr. at 160: 10-21, for which she had been awarded a medical and educational trust 
fund and was receiving monthly payments from life time annuities. Mr. Johnson did not 
work during the marriage and as of the trial on May 9, 2006 had not worked since the 
parties' separation on October 19, 2004. Tr. at 78: 5-25; 86: 24-25; 87: 108; Rec. 1 Mr. 
Johnson testified that he had recently obtained employment which was scheduled to 
begin the Monday after the trial of this matter. Tr. at 78: 5-25; 79: 1-20 Mr. Johnson had 
been injured in a rear-end crash in August, 2002, Tr. at 80: 21-23; 96: 17-25; 152: 16-25 
and subsequently had surgery to repair a vertebrate, Tr. at 153: 1-10, but presented no 
testimony or evidence claiming that he had ever been unable to work for any reason. The 
sole source of income to the household during the two year marriage were the life time 
annuities payments and investment account earnings of Ms. Castillo, all of which were 
her pre-marital property. 
The testimony and evidence presented at trial did not establish that Mr. Johnson 
performed domestic duties and/or child care so as to free Ms. Castillo to work or perform 
services to enhance the value of her pre-marital properties. Cf Savage, 658 P.2d at 1204; 
Elman, 45 P.3d at 180. Testimony and evidence was consistent that both parties were at 
home with the child or that the child and Ms. Castillo were in Alaska with her family. 
Ms. Castillo testified that she took one trip for a period of one week and left the child at 
the marital residence with Mr. Johnson. 
The sole instance of a deposit of Mr. Johnson's personal injury settlement funds 
into the separate account of Ms. Castillo on September 11, 2004, the issuance of a check 
for $7,632.50 dated September 15, 2004 and a check for $ 11,237.50 dated October 8, 
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2004 from that account, amounts which somewhat correspond with the amounts 
handwritten on a landscape company bid proposal, and one payment of $3,005.97 for the 
mortgage principal and interest on September 29, 2004 do not rise to any appreciable 
level to establish Mr. Johnson's financial contribution towards growth, or the 
augmentation or enhancement of Ms. Castillo's pre-marital asset. The separate account 
of Ms. Castillo continued to receive separate annuity funds sufficient to pay for tile, 
landscaping, and all of the other household expenses. There was no testimony or 
evidence presented to establish any reason why any appreciation of the subject real 
property occurred during the marriage. Cf., Burke, 733 P.2d at 135. 
The trial court's finding that Mr. Johnson's efforts were insufficient to entitle him 
to an equitable share in the appreciation of the premarital asset during the marriage is 
supported by the weight of the evidence and well within the discretion of the trial court in 
distributing property in this divorce proceeding. 
E* Mr. Johnson has Failed to Marshal the Evidence to 
Support His Claim That Ms. Castillo's Premarital Assets 
Were Contributed to the Marriage 
Mr. Johnson argues that the trial court's ruling failed to properly consider that Ms. 
Castillo contributed the subject real property to the marriage. This argument is a 
challenge to a finding of fact made by the trial court as to which Mr, Johnson has failed 
to marshal any evidence. 
Mr. Johnson argues on appeal that the trial court failed to properly consider that 
Ms. Castillo had contributed the subject real property to the marriage for the reasons that 
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she purchased the property after her marriage to Mr. Johnson and after the birth of their 
child, and that the three of them lived together in the property. Mr. Johnson further 
argues that the absence of a prenuptial agreement between the parties coupled with Ms. 
Castillo's knowledge that Mr. Johnson was without assets, evidences Ms. Castillo's intent 
to contribute the property to the marriage. 
Having failed to marshal the evidence on this challenge to the finding of the trial 
court that Ms. Castillo had kept the subject real property separate, Mr. Johnson's 
arguments regarding any alleged contribution should be disregarded. 
F. The Trial Court did not Misapply the Law in Determining 
That Ms. Castillo Maintained her Property as Separate 
Property 
Mr. Johnson claims that because Ms. Castillo knew that he had no assets coming 
into the marriage she had an affirmative duty to insist upon a prenuptial agreement. Mr. 
Johnson asserts that because no prenuptial agreement was entered into by the parties it 
evidences Ms. Castillo's intent to commingle or contribute her premarital property to the 
marriage. 
This argument is contrary to Utah law. 
Generally, the rule for premarital property is that each party 
retain the separate property he or she brought into the 
marriage. 
Dunn, 802P.2datl321. 
Premarital property loses its separate identity and becomes a 
part of the marital estate if (1) the other spouse has by his or 
her efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, 
maintenance, or protection of that property thereby acquiring 
an equitable interest in it, or (1) the property has been 
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consumed or its identity lost through commingling or 
exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of 
an interest therein to the other spouse. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. 
There is no statutory or case law in Utah to support the proposition that the 
absence of a prenuptial agreement constitutes a waiver of separate property or a default 
making a gift to the marriage. The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed a trial court's order 
finding there was no intention to make a gift to a spouse even when a joint tenancy in real 
property had been conveyed. Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). 
In the instant case there was no creation of a joint tenancy in the subject real 
property and Mr. Johnson was not added to any of the bank or investment accounts titled 
to Ms. Castillo. A joint bank account was opened by the parties, funded by Ms. Castillo 
from her separate bank account, and closed after the separation of the parties. Addendum 
5 [Exhibit #17, p. 186]. 
Ms. Castillo gave the following testimony at trial: 
Mr. RICHMAN: Q. Do you understand what prenuptial agreements are: 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you feel that the personal property or the bank accounts you had 
and the money you had was yours? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And was to stay yours? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever entertain any other thought by marrying Mr. Johnson? 
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A. No. 
Tr.atl49: 13-15; Tr. at 150: 1-8 
And later testified 
Q. (BY Mr. RICHMAN) Did you ever express any agreement with Travis 
to give the house to him or any portion of it? 
A. No. 
Q. Or your bank account or any portion of it? 
A. No. 
Tr. at 155: 25; Tr. at 156: 1-5. 
The trial court is viewed as being in the best position to gauge and assess the 
credibility of the witnesses. 
In reviewing such a claim [challenge to court's findings of 
fact] we give due regard "to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses,", and we do not set 
aside a challenged finding except when we determine it to be 
clearly erroneous Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 603. 
Having heard the testimony of both Ms. Castillo and Mr. Johnson and having 
received the documentary evidence, the trial court appropriately applied the law as 
established by the appellate courts and ruled that Ms. Castillo had maintained her 
premarital property as separate property and had not commingled, gifted, or contributed 
any of her separate property to the marriage. 
The clear and uncontroverted evidence, exclusive of the claimed error in 
expression, capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment, supports the 
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trial court's finding that the subject real property was Ms. Castillo's separate property, 
did not become marital property, and that Mr. Johnson did not acquire an equitable 
interest in the subject property through contributing to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection of that property, and its rulings should be affirmed. There is a reasonable basis 
to support the trial court's findings, and the trial court's findings should be affirmed. 
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 603; Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) 
G. The Trial Court Did Not Misapply the Law in Awarding 
All Appreciation to Ms, Castillo 
Mr. Johnson challenges the ruling of the trial court awarding the subject real 
property and all of its appreciation to Ms. Castillo as her separate property, subject to 
reimbursement of $14,000.00 to Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson attempts to recharacterize the 
trial court's ruling into one of an inequitable distribution of marital property. He then 
leaps to an assertion that the trial court did not make adequate findings of fact to justify 
an unequal distribution of purported marital property and attempts to marshal the 
evidence to establish that inadequate facts are in the record upon which the trial court 
could properly base an unequal distribution of marital property. 
The law in Utah provides 
In distributing property in divorce proceedings, trial courts 
are first required to properly categorize the parties' property 
as marital or separate. See, e.g., Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT 
App 236 ,% 24, 9 P.3d 171. Generally trial courts are also 
required to award premarital property, and appreciation on 
that property, to the spouse who brought the property into the 
marriage. See Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1990); see also Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 
308 (Utah 1988). 
However, separate property is not "totally beyond [a] court's 
reach in an equitable property division." Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The court may award 
the separate property of one spouse to the other spouse in 
"extraordinary situations where equity so demands." Id. 
(quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308); see also Rappleye v. 
Rappleye, 855 P.2d 160, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
("Exceptions to this general rule include whether . . . the 
distribution achieves a fair, just, and equitable result.'" 
quoting Dunn, 802 P.2d at 1320)). 
Elman, 45 P.3d at 180. 
Mr. Johnson presented no testimony or evidence at trial to support any claim to 
Ms. Castillo's pre-marital and separate property based upon his special needs. Ms. 
Castillo did not have the burden of persuading the court that she had a special need to 
retain her separate property where the court did not award any of it to Mr. Johnson. No 
remand is appropriate on the issue of the needs of Mr. Johnson as none were presented at 
trial. 
Alternatively, if the court determines that the trial court erred in its ruling and 
finds that Mr. Johnson acquired an equitable interest in the appreciation of the subject 
real property, the ruling of the trial court should still be upheld. 
i. Additional Facts Supporting the Ruling 
In Mr. Johnson's putative attempt to marshal the evidence he cites select portions 
of the testimony of Linda Crandall, Ms. Castillo's mother; and Ms. Castillo's testimony, 
and only those portions which support his claim. 
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Attached as Addendum 7 are the pages of the trial transcript containing all of Ms. 
Crandall's testimony [Tr. at 28-34]; all of Ms. Castillo's testimony pertaining to her 
injuries and her medical needs [Tr. 151, 152, 158-160, 167]; and the trial transcript pages 
containing questions asked by the trial court and comments regarding findings pertaining 
to Ms. Castillo's injuries and her medical needs [Tr. 20-22; 168-169] 
ii. The Trial Court's Findings are Detailed and 
Supported by the Record and Itemize Exceptional 
Circumstances Sufficiently to Justify its Allocation 
of Property 
The court appropriately observed and considered the relative needs of the parties 
and acted within the parameters of Utah law when it awarded the appreciation of the 
premarital asset to Ms. Castillo. Here, as in Thomas v. Thomas, 1999 UT 239, 987 P.2d 
603, even if the appreciation of the subject real property were determined to be marital, 
the trial court's findings sufficiently support its allocation of the appreciation of the 
subject real property to Ms. Castillo as an equitable distribution of property by 
considering both parties' circumstances at the time of the divorce. Id. at 610. 
Mr. Johnson's testimony was inconsistent, especially concerning his drug and 
alcohol addiction and his work history. He did not present any documentary evidence to 
support his claims of enhancements to the subject real property. He had not held a job 
since before his marriage to Ms. Castillo and came to court high on drugs and reeking of 
alcohol. He was willing to live off of Ms. Castillo's life time annuities. 
Ms. Castillo's testimony was consistent and she was prepared with documentary 
evidence to substantiate her testimony and claims. Ms. Castillo's separate property was 
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acquired as a result of serious burn injuries she received as a child and consisted of 
annuities and a structured trust fund for her lifetime medical and educational needs. The 
down payment for purchase of the subject real property came from the structured trust 
fimds. The structured trust fund had been used to pay for extensive medical expenses in 
the past and had an approximate balance of $700,000.00 as of the time of trial. Ms. 
Castillo's uncontroverted testimony was that she needed additional surgeries to deal with 
her chronic medical needs arising out of her bums and had postponed needed surgeries 
because of the stress and uncertainty of the pending divorce. 
The trial court explained how it arrived at its conclusion, or at least from the 
record, sufficient record is presented on appeal to allow the appellate court to make the 
determination, there is a reasonable basis to support the trial court's findings, Haumont, 
793 P.2d at 425, and the trial court's findings should be affirmed. The trial court was in 
the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony and a 
challenged finding should not be set aside except when determined to be clearly 
erroneous. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 603. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT REIMBURSED MS. 
CASTILLO $10,000.00 PAID FOR MR. JOHNSON'S MEDICAL 
BILLS 
The rule in Utah is that personal injury settlement proceeds are generally the 
separate property of a spouse. 
Because of the personal nature of special damages, amounts 
received as compensation for pain, suffering, disfigurement, 
disability, or other personal debilitation are generally found to 
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be the personal property of the injured spouse in divorce 
actions. 
See Izatt v. Izatt, 627 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1981) 
Money realized as compensation for lost wages and medical expenses, which 
diminish the marital estate, are considered to be marital property. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 
751 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Utah Ct App, 1988) 
A. Mr. Johnson is Not Entitled to a Remand to Resolve 
Unclear Facts 
Mr. Johnson claims that remand is necessary because of the record contains 
"inadequate facts" regarding when the surgery occurred and the bill paid for. 
Mr. Johnson and Ms. Castillo each testified regarding the crash which caused Mr. 
Johnson's injuries and his subsequent surgery and receipt of settlement sums for his 
damages. The testimony was consistent that the crash occurred in August, 2002, prior to 
the marriage of the parties on October 4, 2002. Tr. at 80: 21-23; 96: 17-24; 97: 1-23; 
153: 4-6 The testimony was consistent that Mr. Johnson had surgery to repair a crushed 
vertebrate and that Ms. Castillo paid for it, but only Ms. Castillo testified as to when the 
surgery occurred. She testified that it was after the marriage and that she paid Dr. 
Reichman over $9,000.00 Tr. at 153: 4-10 
The trial court explained how it arrived at its conclusion, or at least from the 
record, sufficient record is presented on appeal to allow the appellate court to make the 
determination, there is a reasonable basis to support the trial court's findings, Haumont, 
793 P.2d at 425, and the trial court's findings should be affirmed. The trial court was in 
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the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and their testimony and a 
challenged finding should not be set aside except when determined to be clearly 
erroneous. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d at 603. 
The trial court is uniquely suited to observe the demeanor and weigh the 
credibility of the witnesses and their testimony and a challenged finding should not be set 
aside except when determined to be clearly erroneous. Id.. 
Mr. Johnson had the burden of persuasion at trial regarding the disposition of his 
personal injury settlement proceeds and had access to all documentation and evidence 
pertaining to when his personal injury claim arose, when his surgery occurred, and when 
and how much was paid for the surgery. Mr. Johnson failed to present any documentary 
evidence to the court to establish the facts he now claims are unclear and is not entitled to 
a remand to the trial court in order to present more evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr, Johnson has failed to meet his burden to persuade that there has been a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 
error, that the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. The trial court 
appropriately categorized the real property purchased by Ms. Castillo as her separate 
property based upon the uncontroverted evidence. The claimed error in expression by the 
trial court pertaining to all of the mortgage principal and interest payments having been 
paid by Ms. Castillo from her separate funds is harmless, and even had it been omitted or 
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stated differently, Mr. Johnson has not shown that it would have changed or affected the 
ruling of the trial court. 
Mr. Johnson is not entitled to a remand on the issues of when his surgery occurred 
and when the bill for the surgery was paid as he could have presented the evidence at trial 
and failed to do so. 
Mr. Johnson's appeal should be dismissed and the order and judgment of the trial 
court affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this H* day of May, 2007. 
HMAN & RICHMAN, LLC 
BARBARA W. RICHMAN 
GLEN M. RICHMAN 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
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DEFINITIONS 
Words used in multiple sections of this document are defined below and odier words are defined in Sections 3,11, 
13, 18, 20 and 21. Certain rules regarding the usage of words used in this document are also provided in Section 16. 
(A) "Security Instrument" means this document, which is dated FEBRUARY 2 4 2 0 0 3 , 
together witfi all Riders to this document. 
(B) "Borrower" is CAMILLE R. CASTILLO , A SINGLE WOMAN 
Borrower is the trustor under this Security Instrument. 
(O "Lender" is RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE ASSISTANCE ENTERPRISE, LLC 
Lenderisa LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY organized 
and existing under the laws of DELAWARE 
Lender's address is 3 3 5 0 EAST BIRCH STREET, SUITE 1 0 2 , BREA, CALIFORNIA 
9 2 8 2 1 
(D) "Trustee" is BACKMAN STEWART TITLE , 1 6 7 EAST 610 0 SOUTH , SALT 
LAKE CITY , UTAH 8 4 1 0 7 
(E) "MERS" is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc MERS is a separate coiporadon that is acting 
solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns MERS is the beneficiary under this Security 
Instrument. MERS is organized and existing under the laws of Delaware, and has an address and telephone number 
of P.O. Box 2026, Flint, MI 48501-2026, tcl. (888) 679-MERS 
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rtichman COMPANY: 
(F) "Note" means the promissory note signed by Borrower and dated FEBRUARY 2 4 2 0 03 
The Note states that Borrower owes Lender TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY TOO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED 
MD 00/100 Dollars (U.S. $ 272, 500 .00 ) plus interest. Borrower has promised to pay 
this debt in regular Periodic Payments and to pay the debt in full not later than MARCH 1 , 2 03 3 
(G) "Property" means the propeny dial is described below under die heading "Transfer of Rights in the Property." 
(H) "Loan" means die debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late charges due under 
the Note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest. 
(I) "Riders" means all Riders to this Security Instrument that are executed by Borrower. The following Riders 
are to be executed by Borrower [check box as applicable)-
C2 Adjustable Rate Rider O Condominium Rider Q Second Home Rider 
• Balloon Rider • Planned Unit Development Rider 0 Other*s) [specify] 
• 1-4 Family Rider Q Biweekly Payment Rider P r e p a y m e n t 
(J) "Applicable Law" means all controlling applicable federal, state and local statutes, regulations, ordinances and 
administrative rules and orders (diat have the effect of law) as well as all applicable final, non-appealable judicial 
opinions. 
(K) "Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments" means all dues, fees, assessments and other charges 
that are imposed on Borrower or the Propeny by a condominium association, homeowners association or similar 
organization. 
(L) "Electronic Funds Transfer" means any transfer of funds, odier than a transaction originated by check, draft, 
or similar paper instrument, which is initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic instrument, computer, or 
magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial institution to debit or credit an account. Such term 
includes, but is not limited to, point-of-sale transfers, automated teller machine transactions, transfers initiated by 
telephone, wire transfers, and automated clearinghouse transfers. 
(M) "Escrow Items" means those items that are described in Section 3. 
(N) "Miscellaneous Proceeds" means any compensation, settlement, award of damages, or proceeds paid by any 
diird party (other than insurance proceeds paid under the coverages described in Section 5) for: (i) damage to, or 
destruction of, the Property; (ii) condemnation or other taking of all or any pan of die Property; (iii) conveyance in 
lieu of condemnation; or (iv) misrepresentations of, or omissions as to, the value and/or condition of the Property. 
(O) "Mortgage Insurance" means insurance protecting Lender against the nonpayment of, ordefault on, the Loan. 
(P) "Periodic Payment" means' the regularly scheduled amount due for (i) principal and interest under die Note. 
plus (ii) any amounts under Section 3 of this Security Instrument. 
(Q) "RESPA" means die Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (12 U.S.C. §2601 et seq.) and its implementing 
regulation, Regulation X (24 C.F.R. Part 3500), as they might be amended from time to time, or any additional or 
successor legislation or regulation that governs the same subject matter. As used in this Security Instrument, 
"RESPA" refers to all requirements and restrictions that are imposed in regard to a "federally related mortgage loan" 
even if the Loan does not qualify as a "federally related mortgage loan" under RESPA. 
(R) "Successor in Interest of Borrower" means any party that has taken title to the Propeny, whether or not that 
party has assumed Borrower's obligations under the Note and/or this Security Instrument. 
UTAH-Smgle Family Fannie Mde/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT MERS DocMagicGF*imJSX sco 6^9 1362 
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):aienn'Kichman COMPANY: 
TRANSFER OF RIGHTS IN THE PROPERTY 
The beneficiary of this Security Instrument is MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and 
assigns) and die successors and assigns of MERS. This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the repayment of 
the Loan, and all renewals, extensions and modifications of die Note; and (it) the performance of Borrower's 
covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Borrower irrevocably 
grants, conveys and warr&nts to Trustee, in trust, widi power of sale, die following described property located in the 
COUNTY o f SALT LAKE 
(Type of Recording Jurisdiction) (Name of Recording Jurisdiction! 
LOT 3 6 OAK V I S T A N O . 1 AT SUNSET, AS SHOWN ON THE O F F I C I A L PLAT 
THEREOF ON F I L E AND OF RECORD I N THE SALT LAKE COUNTY R E C O R D E R S 
O F F I C E 
A . P . N . # # : 3 4 - 0 9 - 4 7 8 - 0 0 3 
which currently has the address of 1 8 9 2 EAST DEEP WOODS DRIVE 
(Street) 
DRAPER , Utah 84020 ("Property Address"): 
[City] IZipCodeJ 
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, 
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a pan of die propeny. All replacements and addidons shall also be 
covered by this Security Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in uiis Security Instrument as die "Propeny." 
Borrower understands and agrees diat MERS holds only legal tide to the interests granted by Borrower in this Security 
Instrument, but, if necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors 
and assigns) has die right: to exercise any or all of those interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose 
and sell the Propeny; and to take any action required of Lender including, but not limited to, releasing and canceling 
this Security Instrument. 
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of die estate hereby conveyed and has die right 
to grant, convey and warrant the Property and that the Propeny is unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. 
Borrower further warrants and will defend generally the tide to die Propeny against all claims and demands, subject 
to any encumbrances of record. 
THIS SECURITY INSTRUMENT combines uniform covenants for national use and non-uniform covenants 
widi limited variations by jurisdiction to constitute a uniform security instrument covering real property. 
UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: 
1. Payment of Principal, Interest, Escrow Items, Prepayment Charges, and Late Charges. Borrower 
shall pay when due die principal of, and interest on, die debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment charges and 
late charges due under the Note. Borrower shall also pay funds for Escrow Items pursuant to Section 3. Payments 
due under the Note and this Security Instrument shall be made in U.S. currency However, if any check or other 
instrument received by Lender as payment under the Note or this Security Instrument is returned to Lender unpaid. 
Lender may require that any or all subsequent payments due under the Note and this Security Instrument be made in 
one or more of the following forms, as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, 
treasurer's check or cashier's check, provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured 
by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer. 
Payments are deemed received by Lender when received at die location designated in the Note or at such other 
location as may be designated by Lender in accordance with the notice provisions in Section 15. Lender may return 
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any payment or parual payment if the payment or partial payments are insufficient to bring the Loan current. Lender 
may accept any payment or partial payment insufficient to bring the Loan current, without waiver of any rights 
hereunder or prejudice to its rights to refuse such payment or partial payments in die future, but Lender is not 
obligated to apply such payments at the time such payments are accepted. If each Periodic Payment is applied as of 
its scheduled due date, dien Lender need not pay interest on unapplied funds. Lender may hold such unapplied funds 
uncil Borrower makes payment to bring the Loan current. If Borrower does not do so within a reasonable period of 
time, Lender shall either apply such funds or return them to Borrower. If not applied earlier, such funds will be 
applied to the outstanding principal balance under die Note immediately prior to foreclosure. No offset or claim 
which Borrower might have now or in the future against Lender shall relieve Borrower from making payments due 
under the Note and this Security Instrument or performing the covenants and agreements secured by this Security 
Instrument. 
2. Application of Payments or Proceeds. Except as otherwise described in this Section 2, all payments 
accepted and applied by Lender shall be applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest due under the Note; 
(b) principal due under the Note; (c) amounts due under Section 3. Such payments shall be applied to each Periodic 
Payment in die order in which it became due. Any remaining amounts shall be applied first to late charges, second 
to any other amounts due under this Security Instrument, and then to reduce the principal balance of the Note. 
If Lender receives a payment from Borrower for a delinquent Periodic Payment which includes a sufficient 
amount to pay any late charge due, the payment may be applied to die delinquent payment and the late charge. If 
more than one Periodic Payment is outstanding, Lender may apply any payment received from Borrower to the 
repayment of the Periodic Payments if, and to the extent tfiat, each payment can be paid in full. To the extent that 
any excess exists after die payment is applied to the full payment of one or more Periodic Payments, such excess may 
be applied to any late charges due. Voluntary prepayments shall be applied first to any prepayment charges and then 
as described in the Note. 
Any application of payments, insurance proceeds, or Miscellaneous Proceeds to principal due under the Note 
shall not extend or postpone die due date, or change the amount, of the Periodic Payments. 
3. Funds For Escrow Items. Borrower shall pay to Lender on the day Periodic Payments are due under the 
Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum (the "Funds") to provide for payment of amounts due for: (a) taxes and 
assessments and other items which can attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien or encumbrance on the 
Property; (b) leasehold payments or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) premiums for any and all insurance 
required by Lender under Section 5; and (d) Mortgage Insurance premiums, if any, or any sums payable by Borrower 
to Lender in lieu of the payment of Mortgage Insurance premiums in accordance widi the provisions of Section 10. 
These items are called "Escrow Items.n At origination or at any time during the term of the Loan, Lender may require 
that Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any, be escrowed by Borrower, and such dues, fees and 
assessments shall be an Escrow Item. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid 
under this Section. Borrower shall pay Lender the Funds for Escrow Items unless Lender waives Borrower's 
obligation to pay die Funds for any or all Escrow Items. Lender may waive Borrower's obligation to pay to Lender 
Funds foranyorall Escrow Items at any time. Any such waiver may only be in writing. Intheeventof such waiver, 
Borrower shall pay directly, when and where payable, the amounts due for any Escrow Items for which payment of 
Funds has been waived by Lender and, if Lender requires, shall furnish to Lender receipts evidencing such payment 
widiin such time period as Lender may require. Borrower's obligation to make such payments and to provide receipts 
shall for all purposes be deemed to be a covenant and agreement contained in this Security Instrument, as the phrase 
Covenant and agreement" is used in Section 9. If Borrower is obligated to pay Escrow Items directly, pursuant to 
a waiver, and Borrower fails to pay the amount due for an Escrow Item, Lender may exercise its rights under Section 
9 and pay such amount and Borrower shall then be obligated under Section 9 to repay to Lender any such amount. 
Lender may revoke the waiver as to any or all Escrow Items at any time by a notice given in accordance with Section 
15 and, upon such revocation, Borrower shall pay to Lender all Funds, and in such amounts, that are then required 
under this Section 3. 
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount (a) sufficient to permit Lender to apply die Funds 
at the time specified under RESPA, and (b) not to exceed die maximum amount a lender can require under RESPA. 
Lender shall estimate the amount of Funds due on die basis of current data and reasonable estimates of expenditures 
of future Escrow Items or otherwise in accordance with Applicable Law. 
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The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or 
entity (including Lender, if Lender is an institution whose deposits are so insured) or in any Federal Home Loan 
Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the Escrow Items no later than the time specified under RESPA. Lender 
shall not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually analyzing die escrow account, or verifying 
the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and Applicable Law permits Lender to make 
such a charge. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on the Funds, 
Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and Lender can agree 
in writing, however, that interest shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, an 
annual accounting of the Funds as required by RESPA. 
If there is a surplus of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall account to Borrower for 
the excess funds in accordance with RESPA. If there is a shortage of Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, 
Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower shall pay to Lender die amount necessary to make 
up the shortage in accordance with RESPA, but in no more dun 12 monthly payments. If there is a deficiency of 
Funds held in escrow, as defined under RESPA, Lender shall notify Borrower as required by RESPA, and Borrower 
shall pay to Lender the amount necessary to make up the deficiency in accordance with RESPA, but in no more than 
12 monthly payments. 
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall prompdy refund to Borrower 
any Funds held by Lender. 
4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines, and impositions attributable 
to the Property which can attain priority over diis Security Instrument, leasehold payments or ground rents on the 
Property, if any, and Community Association Dues, Fees, and Assessments, if any, To die extent that these items 
are Escrow Items, Borrower shall pay them in the manner provided in Section 3. 
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless Borrower: 
(a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to Lender, but only 
so long as Borrower is performing such agreement; (b) contests die lien in good faith by, or defends against 
enforcement of the lien in, legal proceedings which in Lender's opinion operate to prevent die enforcement of die lien 
while those proceedings arc pending, but only until such proceedings are concluded; or (c) secures from the holder 
of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating the lien to this Security Instrument- If Lender 
determines that any pan of die Property is subject to a lien which can attain priority over this Security Instrument, 
Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the lien. Within 10 days of the date on which that notice is given, 
Borrower shall satisfy die lien or take one or more of the actions set forth above in this Section 4. 
Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge tor a real estate tax verification and/or reporting service 
used by Lender in connection widi this Loan. 
5. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the 
Property insured against loss by fire, hazards included widiin the term "extended coverage," and any other hazards 
including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be 
maintained in the amounts (including deductible levels) and for the periods diat Lender requires. What Lender 
requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during die term of die Loan. The insurance carrier providing 
the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's right to disapprove Borrower's choice, which right shall 
not be exercised unreasonably. Lender may require Borrower to pay, in connection with this Loan, either: (a) a one-
time charge for flood zone determination, certification and tracking services; or (b) a one-time charge for flood zone 
determination and certification services and subsequent charges each time remappings or similar changes occur which 
reasonably might affect such determination or certification. Borrower shall also be responsible for the payment of 
any fees imposed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in connection widi the review of any flood zone 
determination resulting from an objection by Borrower. 
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, Lender may obtain insurance coverage, at 
Lender's option and Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any particular type or amount 
of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover Lender, but might or might not protect Borrower, Borrower's 
equity in die Property, or die contents of the Property, against any risk, hazard or liability and might provide greater 
or lesser coverage than was previously in effect. Borrower acknowledges that die cost of the insurance coverage so 
obtained might significantly exceed the cost of insurance that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts disbursed 
by Lender under this Section 5 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Securicy Instrument. These 
UTAH--Single Family-Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac UNIFORM INSTRUMENT - MERS DocMagfcGPicrrMs aoo-649-i362 
Form 3045 1/01 Page 5 of 13 www.d0cm3gic.com 
000102 
Gienn Kichman COMPANY: 
amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, 
upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment. 
All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such policies shall be subject to Lender's right to 
disapprove such policies, shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an 
additional loss payee. Lender shall have the righc to hold the policies and renewal certificates. If Lender requires, 
Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid premiums and renewal notices. If Borrower obtains any 
form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to, or destruction of, the Property, such 
policy shall include a standard mongage clause and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss 
payee. 
In die event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may make 
proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any 
insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance was required by Lender, shall be applied to restoration 
or repair of the Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. 
During such repair and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such insurance proceeds until Lender 
has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, 
provided that such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and 
restoration in a single payment or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement 
is made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be 
required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters, or other diird parties, 
retained by Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. 
If the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be lessened, the insurance proceeds 
shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid 
to Borrower. Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order provided for in Section 2. 
If Borrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any available insurance claim and 
related matters. If Borrower does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the insurance carrier has 
offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate and settle die claim. The 30-day period will begin when the 
notice is given. In either event, or if Lender acquires the Property under Section 22 or otherwise, Borrower hereby 
. assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's rights to any insurance proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts unpaid 
under die Note or this Security Instrument, and (b) any other of Borrower's rights (other than the right to any refund 
of unearned premiums paid by Borrower) under all insurance policies covering the Property, insofar as such rights 
are applicable to the coverage of the Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or restore the 
Property or to pay amounts unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. 
6. Occupancy. Borrower shall occupy, establish, and use the Property as Borrower's principal residence 
within 60 days after die execution of this Security Instrument and shall continue to occupy the Property as Borrower's 
principal residence for at least one year after the date of occupancy, unless Lender otherwise agrees in writing, which 
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld, or unless extenuating circumstances exist which are beyond Borrower's 
control. 
7. Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Inspections. Borrower shall not destroy, 
damage or impair the Property, allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property. Whether or not 
Borrower is residing in the Property, Borrower shall maintain die Property in order to prevent the Property from 
deteriorating or decreasing in value due to its condition. Unless it is determined pursuant to Section 5 that repair or 
restoration is not economically feasible, Borrower shall promptly repair the Property if damaged to avoid further 
deterioration or damage. If insurance or condemnation proceeds are paid in connection with damage to, or the taking 
of, the Property, Borrower shall be responsible for repairing or restoring die Property only if Lender has released 
proceeds for such purposes. Lender may disburse proceeds for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in 
a series of progress payments as the work is completed. If the insurance or condemnation proceeds are not sufficient 
to repair or restore die Property, Borrower is not relieved of Borrowers obligation for the completion of such repair 
or restoration. 
Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property. If it has reasonable 
cause, Lender may inspect die interior of the improvements on the Property. Lender shall give Borrower notice at 
the time of or prior to such an interior inspection specifying such reasonable cause. 
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8. Borrower's Loan Application. Borrower shall be in default if, during the Loan application process, 
Borrower or any persons or entities acting at the direction of Borrower or with Borrower's knowledge or consent gave 
materially false, misleading, or inaccurate information or statements to Lender (or failed to provide Lender with 
material information) in connection with the Loan. Material representations include, but are not limited to, 
representations concerning Borrower's occupancy of die Property as Borrower's principal residence. 
9. Protection of Lender's Interest in the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument. If (a) 
Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in this Security Instrument, (b) there is a legal 
proceeding that might significandy affect Lender's interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument 
(such as a proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture, for enforcement of a lien which may 
attain priority over this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or regulations), or (c) Borrower has abandoned the 
Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender's interest in the 
Property and rights under this Security Instrument, including protecting and/or assessing the value of the Property, 
and securing and/or repairing die Property. Lender's actions can include, but arc not limited to: (a) paying any sums 
secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing in court; and (c) paying reasonable 
attorneys' fees to protect its interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Instrument, including its secured 
position in a bankruptcy proceeding. Securing the Property includes, but is not limited to, entering the Property to 
make repairs, change locks, replace or board up doors and windows, drain water from pipes, eliminate building or 
odier code violations or dangerous conditions, and have utilities turned on or off. Although Lender may take action 
under this Section 9, Lender does not have to do so and is not under any duty or obligation to do so. It is agreed that 
Lender incurs no liability for not taking any or all actions authorized under this Section 9. 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by 
this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall 
be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment. 
If this Security Instrument is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of die lease. If 
Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the leasehold and the fee title shall not merge unless Lender agrees to the 
merger in writing. 
10. Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making the Loan, 
Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the Mortgage Insurance in effect. If, for any reason, the 
Mortgage Insurance coverage required by Lender ceases to be available from the mortgage insurer that previously 
provided such insurance and Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward the premiums 
for Mortgage Insurance, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage substantially equivalent to the 
Mortgage Insurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of the Mortgage 
Insurance previously in effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer selected by Lender. If substantially equivalent 
Mortgage Insurance coverage is not available, Borrower shall continue to pay to Lender die amount of die separately 
designated payments that were due when the insurance coverage ceased to be in effect. Lender will accept, use and 
retain these payments as a non-refundable loss reserve in lieu of Mortgage Insurance. Such loss reserve shall be non-
refundable, notwidistanding the fact diat the Loan is ultimately paid in full, and Lender shall not be required to pay 
Borrower any interest or earnings on such loss reserve. Lender can no longer require loss reserve payments if 
Mortgage Insurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided by an iasurer selected 
by Lender again becomes available, is obtained, and Lender requires separately designated payments toward the 
premiums for Mortgage Insurance. If Lender required Mortgage Insurance as a condition of making die Loan and 
Borrower was required to make separately designated payments toward die premiums for Mortgage Insurance, 
Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain Mortgage Insurance in effect, or to provide a non-refundable 
loss reserve, until Lender's requirement for Mortgage Insurance ends in accordance with any written agreement 
between Borrower and Lender providing for such termination or until termination is required by Applicable Law. 
Nodiing in this Section 10 affects Borrower's obligation to pay interest at the rate provided in the Note. 
Mortgage Insurance reimburses Lender (or any entity that purchases the Note) for certain losses it may incur 
if Borrower does not repay die Loan as agreed. Borrower is not a party to the Mortgage Insurance. 
Mortgage insurers evaluate dieir total risk on all such insurance in force from time to time, and may enter into 
agreements widi other parties that share or modify dieir risk,.or reduce losses. These agreements are on terms and 
conditions that are satisfactory to die mortgage insurer and the odier party (or parties) to these agreements. These 
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agreements may require the mortgage insurer to make payments using any source of ftinds that the mortgage insurer 
may have available (which may include funds obtained from Mortgage Insurance premiums). 
As a result of these agreements, Lender, any purchaser of die Note, another insurer, any reinsurer, any other 
entity, or any affiliate of any of the foregoing, may receive (direcdy or indirectly) amounts that derive from (or might 
be characterized as) a portion of Borrower's payments for Mortgage Insurance, in exchange for sharing or modifying 
the mortgage insurer's risk, or reducing losses. If such agreement provides that an affiliate of Lender takes a share 
of the insurer's risk in exchange for a share of the premiums paid to the insurer, the arrangement is often termed 
"captive reinsurance." Further: 
(a) Any such agreements will not affect the amounts that Borrower has agreed to pay for Mortgage 
Insurance, or any other terms of the Loan. Such agreements will not increase the amount Borrower will owe 
for Mortgage Insurance, and they will not entitle Borrower to any refund. 
(b) Any such agreements will not affect the rights Borrower has - if any - with respect to the Mortgage 
Insurance under the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 or any other law. These rights may include the right 
to receive certain disclosures, to request and obtain cancellation of the Mortgage Insurance, to have the 
Mortgage Insurance terminated automatically, and/or to receive a refund of any Mortgage Insurance premiums 
that were unearned at the time of such cancellation or termination. 
11. Assignment of Miscellaneous Proceeds; Forfeiture. All Miscellaneous Proceeds are hereby assigned to 
and shall be paid to Lender. 
If die Property is damaged, such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to restoration or repair of the 
Property, if die restoration or repair is economically feasible and Lender's security is not lessened. During such repair 
and restoration period, Lender shall have the right to hold such Miscellaneous Proceeds until Lender has had an 
opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure die work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that 
such inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may pay for die repairs and restoration in a single disbursement 
or in a series of progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is made in writing or Applicable 
Law requires interest to be paid on such Miscellaneous Pruceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any 
interest or earnings on such Miscellaneous Proceeds. If the restoration or repair is not economically feasible or 
Lender's security would be lessened, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security 
Instrument, whether or not then due, with die excess, if any, paid to Borrower. Such Miscellaneous Proceeds shall 
be applied in die order provided for in Section 2. 
In the event of a total taking, destruction, or loss in value of the Property, the Miscellaneous Proceeds shall 
be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, widi the excess, if any, paid to 
Borrower. 
In the event of a partial taking, destruction* or loss in value of die Property in which the fair market value of 
die Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is equal to or greater than the amount 
of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, 
unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the sums secured by this Security Instrument shall be reduced 
by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds multiplied by the following fraction: (a) the total amount of the sums 
secured immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value divided by (b) the fair market value of the 
Property immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value. Any balance shall be paid to Borrower. 
In the event of a partial taking, destruction, or loss in value of die Property in which die fair market value of 
the Property immediately before die partial taking, destruction, or loss in value is less than the amount of the sums 
secured immediately before the partial taking, destruction, or loss in value, unless Borrower and Lender otherwise 
agree in writing, die Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument whether 
or not die sums are then due. 
If die Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower diat the Opposing Party 
(as defined in die next sentence) offers to make an award to settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to 
Lender within 30 days after the date die notice is given, Lender is audiorizcd to collect and apply the Miscellaneous 
Proceeds eidier to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether 
or not dien due. "Opposing Party" means the third party diat owes Borrower Miscellaneous Proceeds or the party 
against whom Borrower has a right of action in regard to Miscellaneous Proceeds. 
Borrower shall be in default if any action or proceeding, whedier civil or criminal, is begun that, in lender's 
judgment, could result in forfeiture of die Property or odier material impairment of Lender's interest in die Property 
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or rights under this Security Instrument. Borrower can cure such a default and, if acceleration has occurred, reinstate 
as provided in Section 19, by causing the action or proceeding to be dismissed with a ruling diat, in Lender's 
judgment, precludes forfeiture of the Propeny or other material impairment of Lender's interest in the Property or 
rights under this Security Instrument. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages that are attributable to die 
impairment of Lender's interest in the Property are hereby assigned and shall be paid to Lender. 
All Miscellaneous Proceeds thai are not applied to restoration or repair of die Property shall be applied in the 
order provided for in Section 2. 
12. Borrower Not Released; Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver. Extension of the time for payment or 
modification of amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Lender to Borrower or any 
Successor in Interest of Borrower shall not operate to release the liability of Borrower or any Successors in Interest 
of Borrower. Lender shall not be required to commence proceedings against any Successor in Interest of Borrower 
or to refuse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of the sums secured by this Security 
Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower or any Successors in Interest of Borrower. Any 
forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy including, without limitation, Lender's acceptance of 
payments from diird persons, entities or Successors in Interest of Borrower or in amounts less than the amount then 
due, shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any right or remedy. 
13. Joint and Several Liability; Co-signers; Successors and Assigns Bound. Borrower covenants and agrees 
that Borrower's obligations and liability shall be joint and several. However, any Borrower whoco-signs this Security 
Instrument but does not execute the Note (a "co-signer*'): (a) is co-signing this Security Instrument only to mortgage, 
grant and convey the co-signer's interest in the Property under die terms of this Security Instrument; (b) is not 
personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) agrees that Lender and any other 
Borrower can agree to extend, modify, forbear or make any accommodations widi regard co the terms of this Security 
Instrument or die Note without the co-signer's consent. 
Subject to the provisions of Section 18, any Successor in Interest of Borrower who assumes Borrower's 
obligations under this Security Instrument in writing, and is approved by Lender, shall obtain all of Borrower's rights 
and benefits under this Security Instrument. Borrower shall not be released from Borrower's obligations and liability 
under this Security Instrument unless Lender agrees to such release in writing. The covenants and agreements of this 
Security Instrument shall bind (except as provided in Section 20) and benefit the successors and assigns of Lender. 
14. Loan Charges. Lender may charge Borrower fees for services performed in connection with Borrower's 
default, for die purpose of protecting Lender's interest in the Propeny and rights under this Security Instrument, 
including, but not limited to, attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation foes. In regard to any other fees, the 
absence of express authority in this Security Instrument to charge a specific fee to Borrower shall not be construed 
as a prohibition on the charging of such fee. Lender may not charge tees diat are expressly prohibited by this Security 
Instrument or by Applicable Law. 
If the Loan is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, and diat law is finally interpreted so diat die 
interest or odier loan charges collected or to be collected in connection widi die Loan exceed die permitted limits, 
then: (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amount necessary to reduce the charge to the permitted limit; 
and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to Borrower. 
Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing die principal owed under die Note or by making a direct payment 
to Borrower. If a refund reduces principal, the reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment without any 
prepayment charge (whedier or not a prepayment charge is provided for under the Note). Borrower's acceptance of 
any such refund made by direct payment to Borrower will constitute a waiver of any right of action Borrower might 
have arising out of such overcharge. 
15. Notices. All notices given by Borrower or Lender in connection with this Security Instrument must be 
in writing. Any notice to Borrower in connection widi this Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been given 
to Borrower when mailed by first class mail or when actually delivered to Borrower's notice address if sent by other 
means. Notice to any one Borrower shall constitute notice to all Borrowers unless Applicable Iiiw expressly requires 
odierwise. The notice address shall be die Property Address unless Borrower has designated a substitute notice 
address by notice to Lender. Borrower shall promptly notify Lender of Borrower's change of address. If Lender 
Specifies a procedure for reporting Borrower's change of address, dien Borrower shall only report a change of address 
through diat specified procedure. There may be only one designated notice address under this Security Instrument 
at any one time. Any notice to Lender shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to Lender's 
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address stated herein unless Lender has designated another address by notice to Borrower Any notice in connection 
with this Security Instrument shall not be deemed to have been given to Lender until actually received by Lender. 
If any notice required by this Security Instrument is also required under Applicable Law, the Applicable Law 
requirement will satisfy the corresponding requirement under this Security Instrument. 
16. Governing Law; Severability; Rules of Construction. This Security Instrument shall be governed by 
federal law and die law of the jurisdiction in which the Property is located. All rights and obligations contained in 
this Security Instrument are subject to any requirements and limitations of Applicable Law. Applicable Law might 
explicidy or implicitly allow die parties to agree by contract or it might be silent, but such silence shall not be 
construed as a prohibition against agreement by contract. In the event that any provision or clause of this Security 
Instrument or the Note conflicts with Applicable Law, such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security 
Instrument or die Note which can be given effect without the conflicting provision. 
As used in this Security Instrument: (a) words of die masculine gender shall mean and include corresponding 
neuter words or words of the feminine gender; (b) words in the singular shall mean and include the plural and vice 
versa; and (c) the word "may" gives sole discretion without any obligation to take any action. 
17. Borrower's Copy. Borrower shall be given one copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument. 
18. Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 1 Sy "Interest in 
the Property* means any legal or beneficial interest in the Property, including, but not limited to, those beneficial 
interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent 
of which is die transfer of title by Borrower at a future date to a purchaser. 
If all or any pan of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or if Borrower is not a 
natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) without Lender's prior written coiuscnt, 
Lender may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument. However, this option 
shall not be exercised by Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law. 
If Lender exercises this option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide 
a period of not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within which 
Borrower must pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to the 
expiration of this period. Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security Instrument widiout further 
notice or demand on Borrower. 
1£. Borrower's Right to Reinstate After Acceleration. I f Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower shall 
have the right to have enforcement of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time prior to die earliest of: (a) five 
days before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Security Instrument; (b) such other 
period as Applicable Law might specify for the termination of Borrowers right to reinstate; or (c) entry of a judgment 
enforcing this Security Instrument. Those conditions are that Borrower: (a) pays Lender all sums which dieu would 
be due under this Security Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any default of any 
other covenants or agreements; (c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but 
not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees, property inspection and valuation fees, and other fees incurred for die 
purpose of protecting Lender's interest in die Property and rights under this Security Instrument; and (d) takes such 
action as Lender may reasonably require to assure that Lender's interest in die Property and rights under this Security 
Instrument, and Borrower's obligation to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument, shall continue unchanged. 
Lender may require diat Borrower pay such reinstatement sums and expenses in one or more of the following forms, 
as selected by Lender: (a) cash; (b) money order; (c) certified check, bank check, treasurer's check or cashier's check, 
provided any such check is drawn upon an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality 
or entity; or (d) Electronic Funds Transfer. Upon reinstatement by Borrower, this Security instrument and obligations 
secured hereby shall remain fully effective as if no acceleration had occurred. However, this right to reinstate shall 
not apply in die case of acceleration under Section 18. 
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer; Notice of Grievance. The Note or a partial interest in the Note 
(together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one or more times widiout prior notice to Borrower. A sale might 
result in a change in the entity (known as the "Loan Servicer") that collects Periodic Payments due under die Note 
and this Security Instrument and performs other mortgage loan servicing obligations under the Note, this Security 
Instrument, and Applicable Law. There also might be one or more changes of die Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale 
of die Note. If there is a change of die Loan Servicer, Borrower will be given written notice of die change which will 
state the name and address of the new Loan Servicer, the address to which payments should be made and any other 
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information RESPA requires in connection with a notice of transfer of servicing. If the Note is sold and thereafter 
the Loan is serviced by a Loan Servicer other than the purchaser of the Note> the mortgage loan servicing obligations 
to Borrower will remain widi the Loan Servicer or be transferred to a successor Loan Servicer and are not assumed 
by the Note purchaser unless otherwise provided by the Note purchaser. 
Neither Borrower nor Lender may commence, join, or be joined to any judicial action (as either an individual 
litigant or the member of a class) that arises from the other pany's actions pursuant to this Security Instrument or that 
alleges that the odier pany has breached any provision of, or any duty owed by reason of, this Security Instrument, 
until such Borrower or Lender has notified die odier party (with such notice given in compliance widi the requirements 
of Section 15) of such alleged breach and afforded the other party hereto a reasonable period after die giving of such 
notice to take corrective action. If Applicable Law provides a time period which must elapse before certain action 
can be taken, that time period will be deemed to be reasonable for purposes of this paragraph. The notice of 
acceleration and opportunity to cure given to Borrower pursuant to Section 22 and the notice of acceleration given 
to Borrower pursuant to Section 18 shall be deemed to satisfy the notice and opportunity to take corrective action 
provisions of this Secrion 20. 
21. Hazardous Substances. As used in this Section 21: (a) "Hazardous Substances" are those substances 
defined as toxic or hazardous substances, pollutants, or wastes by Environmental Law and the following substances: 
gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides and herbicides, volatile solvents, 
materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials; (b) "Environmental Law" means federal 
laws and laws of the jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, safety or environmental protection; 
(c) "Environmental Geanup" includes any response action, remedial action, or removal action, as defined in 
Environmental Law; and (d) an "Environmental Condition" means a condition chat can cause, contribute to, or 
otherwise trigger an Environmental Cleanup. 
Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any Hazardous Substances, 
or threaten to release any Hazardous Substances, on or in die Property. Borrower shall not do, nor allow anyone else 
to do, anything affecting the Property (a) that is in violation of any Environmental Law, (b) which creates an 
Environmental Condition, or (c) which, due to the presence, use, or release of a Hazardous Substance, creates a 
condition that adversely affects the value of the Property. The preceding two sentences shall not apply to the 
presence, use, or storage on the Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally recognized 
to be appropriate to normal residential uses and to maintenance of die Property (including, but not limited to, 
hazardous substances in consumer products). 
Borrower shall prompdy give Lender written nodce of (a) any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit or other 
action by any governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Hazardous Substance 
or Environmental Law of which Borrower has actual knowledge, (b) any Environmental Condition, including but not 
limited to, any spilling, leaking, discharge, release or threat of release of any Hazardous Substance, and (c) any 
condition caused by die presence, use or release of a Hazardous Substance which adversely affects the value of the 
Property. If Borrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or regulatory authority, or any private party, that 
any removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary, Borrower shall 
prompdy take all necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law. Nodiing herein shall create any 
obligation on Lender for an Environmental Cleanup. 
NON-UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
22. Acceleration; Remedies. Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following 
Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument (but not prior to acceleration under 
Section 18 unless Applicable Law provides otherwise). The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the action 
required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to Borrower, by 
which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date specified in the 
notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and sale of the Property. The 
notice shall further inform Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to bring a court 
action to assert <he non-existence of a default or any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and sale. If the 
default is not cured on or before the date specified in the notice, Lender at its option may require immediate 
payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and may invoke the 
power of sale and any other remedies permitted by Applicable Law. Lender shall be entitled to collect all 
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expenses incurred in pursuing the remedies provided in this Section 22, including, but not limited to, reasonable 
attorneys1 fees and costs of title evidence. 
If the power of sale is invoked, Trustee shall execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of 
default and of the election to cause the fYoperty to be sold and shall record such notice in each county in which 
any part of the Property is located. Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of such notice in the manner prescribed 
by Applicable Law to Borrower and to the other persons prescribed by Applicable Law. In the event Borrower 
does not cure the default within the period then prescribed by Applicable Law, Trustee shaJl give public notice 
of the sale to the persons and in the manner prescribed by Applicable Law. After the time required by 
Applicable Law, Trustee, without demand on Borrower, shall sell the Property at public auction to the highest 
bidder at the time and place and under the terms designated in the nodce of sale in one or more parcels and in 
any order Trustee determines (but subject to any statutory right of Borrower to direct the order in which the 
Property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold). Trustee may in accordance with 
Applicable Law, postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public announcement at the time and place 
of any previously scheduled sale. Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale. 
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any covenant or 
warranty, expressed or implied. The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the truth 
of the statements made therein. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order: (a) to all 
expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable Trustee's and attorneys' fees; (b) to all sums 
secured by this Security Instrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally entitled to It or to the 
county clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
23. Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request 
Trustee to reconvey the Property and shall surrender Uiis Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured 
by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty to the person or persons 
legally emitted to it. Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs. Lender may charge such person or 
persons a fee for reconveying the Property, but only if the fee is paid to a third party (such as the Trustee) tor services 
rendered and die charging of the fee is permitted under Applicable Law. 
24. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a successor 
trustee to any Trustee appointed hereunder. Without conveyance of the Property, die successor trustee shall succeed 
to all the title, power and duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by Applicable Law. 
25. Request for Notices. Borrower requests that copies of the notices of default and sale be sent to Borrower's 
address which is the Property Address. 
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to die terms and covenants contained in this Security 
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State of Utah 
County of SALT LAKE 
SS. 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this <j<Z> *C'CQ'^)'^ 
CAMILLE R. CASTILLO 
by 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
PAMELA M. MILLER 
i«r easi aiQU South 
Murray, Uiah a.iiot 
Commission Expires 
February 14. 20U4 
STATE OF UTAH 
Signature of Person Taking Acknowledgment 
Title: 
Residing at: 
(Seal) My commission expires: 
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ADJUSTABLE RATE RIDER 
(LIBOR Six-Month Index (As Published In The Wall Street Journal) - Rate Caps) 
Loan Number: 1000001901 
THIS ADJUSTABLE RATE RIDER is made this 24th day of FEBRUARY 
2 0 0 3 , and is incorporated into and shall be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed of 
Trust, or Security Deed (the "Security Instrument") of the same date given by the undersigned ("Borrower") 
to secure Borrower's Adjustable Rate Note (the "Note") to RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 
ASSISTANCE ENTERPRISE, LLC, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
("Lender") of the same date and covering the property described in the Security Instrument and located at: 
1892 EAST DEEP WOODS DRIVE , DRAPER , UTAH 84020 
[Property Address) 
THE NOTE CONTAINS PROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR CHANGES IN 
THE INTEREST RATE AND THE MONTHLY PAYMENT. THE NOTE 
LIMITS THE AMOUNT BORROWERS INTEREST RATE CAN CHANGE 
AT ANY ONE TIME AND THE MAXIMUM RATE BORROWER MUST 
PAY. 
ADDITIONAL COVENANTS. In addition to the covenants and agreements made in the Security 
Instrument, Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows: 
A. INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES 
The Note provides for an initial interest rate of 7 . 5 4 0 %. The Note provides for changes 
in the interest rate and the monthly payments, as follows: 
4. INTEREST RATE AND MONTHLY PAYMENT CHANGES 
(A) Change Dates 
The interest rate I will pay may change on the 1 s t day of MARCH , 2 0 0 5 
and on diat day every 6 month thereafter. Each date on which my interest rate could change is called 
a "Change Date." 
(B) The Index 
Beginning widi die first Change Date, my interest rate will be based on an Index. The "Index" is die 
average of interbank offered rates for six month U.S. dollar-denominated deposits in the London market 
("LIBOR"), as published in The Wall Street Journal. The most recent Index figure available as of die first 
business day of the month immediately preceding die mondi in which die Chauge Date occurs is called the 
"Current Index." 
If the Index is no longer available, the Note Holder will choose a new index that is based upon 
comparable information. The Note Holder will give me notice of this choice. 
(Q Calculation of Changes 
Before each Change Date, the Note Holder will calculate my new interest rate by adding 
SEVEN AND 3 7 5 / 1 0 0 0 percentage points ( 7 . 3 7 5 % ) to the Current 
Index. The Note Holder will then round die result of this addition to die nearest one-eighdi of one 
percentage point (0.125 9£). Subject to die limits stated in Section 4(D) below, diis rounded amount will be 
my new interest rate until the next Change Date. 
MULTISTATE ADJUSTABLE RATE RIDER--LIBOR SIX MONTH INDEX OocMagiceF&nms coo-643-1362 
(AS PUBLISHED IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL) www.docmagic.com 
Single Family-Fannie Mae MODIFIED INSTRUMENT 
Form 3138 1/01 Page 1 of 3 
0001 
Received (FRI)MAR 31 2006 13:50 
:Glenn rtichman COMPANY: 
The Note Holder will then determine die amount of die monthly payment that would be sufficient to 
repay the unpaid principal diat I am expected to owe at the Change Date in full on the Maturity Date at my 
new interest rate in substantially equal payments. The result of this calculation will be die new amount of 
my monthly payment. 
(D) Limits on Interest Rate Changes 
The interest rate I am required to pay at the first Change Date will not be greater than 8 . 5 4 0 % 
or less than 7 . 5 4 0 %. Thereafter, my interest rate will never be increased or decreased on any 
single Change Date by more than ONE AND 0 0 0 / 1 0 0 0 percentage points 
( 1 . 0 0 0 %) from die rate of interest I have been paying for the precedtngg months. My 
interest rate will never be greater than 1 3 . 5 4 0 %. 
(E) Effective Date of Changes 
My new interest rate will become effective on each Change Date. I will pay the amount of my new 
monthly payment beginning on the first monthly payment date after the Change Date until die amount of my 
monthly payment changes again. 
OF) Notice of Changes 
The Note Holder will deliver or mail to me a notice of any changes in my interest rate and (he amount 
of my monthly payment before the effective date of any change. The notice will include information required 
by law to be given to me and also the title and telephone number of a person who will answer any question 
I may have regarding the notice. 
B. TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY OR A BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN BORROWER 
Uniform Covenant 18 of die Security Instrument is amended to read as follows: 
Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower. As used in this Section 
18, "Interest in the Property" means any legal or beneficial interest in die Property, including, 
but not limited to, those beneficial interests transferred in a bond for deed, contract for deed, 
installment sales contract or escrow agreement, the intent of which is the transfer of tide by 
Borrower at a future date to a purchaser. 
If ail or any part of the Property or any Interest in the Property is sold or transferred (or 
if Borrower is not a natural person and a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred) 
without Lender's prior written consent, Lender may require immediate payment in full of all 
sums secured by this Security Instrument. However, this option shall not be exercised by 
Lender if such exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law. Lender also shall not exercise this 
option if: (a) Borrower causes to be submitted to Lender information required by Lender to 
evaluate the intended transferee as if a new loan were being made to the transferee; and (b) 
Lender reasonably determines that Lender's security will not be impaired by the loan 
assumption and that die risk of a breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security 
Instrument is acceptable to Lender. 
To the extent permitted by Applicable Law, Lender may charge a reasonable fee as a 
condition to Lender's consent to the loan assumption. Lender also may require the transferee 
to sign an assumption agreement diat is acceptable to Lender and diat obligates the transferee 
to keep all the promises and agreements made in the Note and in this Security Instrument. 
Borrower will continue to be obligated under die Note and this Security Instrument unless' 
Lender releases Borrower in writing. 
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If Lender exercises die option to require immediate payment in full, Lender shall give 
Borrower notice of acceleration. The notice shall provide a period of not less than 30 days 
from the date die notice is given in accordance with Section 15 within which Borrower must 
pay all sums secured by this Security Instrument. If Borrower fails to pay these sums prior to 
die expiration of this period, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted by this Security 
Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower. 
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terras and covenants contained in this 
Adjustable Rate Rider. 
(Seal) (Seal) 
ILLE R-^CASTILLO -Borrower -Borrower 
_. (Seal) (Seal) 
-Borrower -Borrower 
- (Seal) (SC'Al) 
-Borrower -Borrower 
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PREPAYMENT RIDER 
Loan Number: 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 0 1 
Date; FEBRUARY 2 4 , 2 0 0 3 
Borrower(s): CAMILLE R. CASTILLO 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned ("Borrower") agree(s) that the following provisions shall 
be incorporated into and shall be deemed to amend and supplement the Mortgage, Deed of Trust or 
Security Deed of even dale herewith (the "Security Instrument") executed by Borrower, as trustor or 
mortgagor, in favor of RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE ASSISTANCE ENTERPRISE, 
LLC, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
("Lender")* as beneficiary or mortgagee, and also into thai cenain promissory noie (the "Note") of 
even date herewidi executed by Borrower in favor of Lender. To the extent that the provisions of this 
Prepayment Rider (the "Rider") are inconsistent with the provisions of the Security Instrument and/or 
die Note, die provisions of the Rider shall prevail over and shall supersede any such inconsistent 
provisions of the Security Instrument and/or the Note-
Section 5 of the Note is amended to read in its endrety as follows: 
"5 . BORROWER'S RIGHT TO PREPAY 
I have the right to make payments of Principal at any time before they are 
due. A payment of Principal only is known as a "Prepayment." When I make a 
Prepayment, I will tell the Note Holder in writing that I am doing so. I may not 
designate a payment as a Prepayment if I have not made all the monthly payments 
due under the Note. 
The Note Holder will use my Prepayments to reduce the amount of Principal 
diat I owe under the Note. However, the Note Holder may apply my Prepayment 
to the accrued and unpaid interest on the Prepayment amount, before applying my 
Prepayment to reduce die Principal amount of the Note. If I make a partial 
Prepayment, there will be no changes in the due dates of my momhly payment unless 
the Note Holder agrees in writing to those changes. 
If the Note provides for changes in the interest rate, my partial Prepayment 
may reduce die amount of my monthly payments after the first Change Date 
following my partial Prepayment. However, any reduction due to my partial 
Prepayment may be offset by an interest rate increase. 
If within TWENTY POUR ( 2 4 ) mondis from the date of execution of 
the Security Instrument I make a full or partial Prepayment, and the total of such 
Prepayments in any 12-month period exceeds TWENTY PERCENT 
( 20 %) of the original Principal amount of die loan, 
I will pay a Prepayment charge in an amount equal to SIX 
( 6 ) months' advance interest on the amount by which the total of my 
Prepayments within that 12-month period exceeds TWENTY PERCENT 
( 20 %) or the original Principal amount of die 
loan." 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, die Borrower has executed this Rider on the day of 
£ n/ytd^ 
3rrower 
[ILLE R. CASTILLO 
Date Borrower Date 
Borrower Date Borrower Date 
Borrower Date Borrower Date 
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ADDENDUM 2 
GAYANNE K. SCHMID (State Bar No. 6793) 
SCHMID & LUHN 
68 South Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-8300 x 320 
Facsimile: (801) 363-2420 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON, 
Respondent. 
COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE 
Civil No. oyv?7o73yex 
Judge: £<ttxM-o^ 
Petitioner, Camille Castillo-Johnson, complains of Respondent, Travis PaulJohnson, as follows: 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO JURISDICTION 
1. Petitioner has been an actual and bona fide resident of Salt Lake County for at least three 
months immediately prior to the filing of the Complaint in this action. 
2. The parties were married on October 4,2002, in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and are still married. The parties separated October 19, 2004. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO GROUNDS 
3. During the course of the marriage, Respondent physically, mentally and emotionally abused 
Petitioner, making continuation of the marriage existing between the parties no longer possible. 
4. A divorce should be granted on the grounds of physical, mental and emotional cruelty. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO CHILD CUSTODY. VISITATION AND CHILD SUPPORT 
5. The parties have one minor child younger than eighteen years of age who is issue of their 
marriage. The name and birth date of the child is as follows: 
Gabriel Golden Johnson, born January 1, 2003 
6. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that Utah is the home state of this 
child, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)(a). 
7. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that neither party has participated, as 
a party, witness, or in any other capacity, in any other litigation concerning the custody of their child in Utah 
or any other state. 
8. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the parties have no knowledge 
of any custody proceeding concerning their child, pending in Utah or any other state. 
9. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the parties do not know of a 
person not a party to this proceeding who has physical custody of their child or who claims to have custody 
or visitation rights with respect to their child. 
10. Petitioner is informed and believes and thereon alleges that neither party has sought or 
received public assistance on behalf of their child. 
11. During their marriage, Petitioner has been primarily responsible for caring for Gabriel and 
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is the most closely bonded to him. Accordingly, it is in Gabriel's best interests for Petitioner to be awarded 
sole legal and physical custody of him. 
12. Respondent should be awarded such reasonable parent time with Gabriel as the parties may 
agree, which at minimum should conform with the statutory visitation guidelines. 
13. Respondent should be restrained from taking Gabriel out of state or more than 50 miles 
from his present home. 
14. Respondent should be responsible for picking Gabriel up at the beginning of his time-sharing 
and return him to day care, school or his home, whichever is appropriate, at the end of his time sharing. 
15. The parties should provide each other with current residential addresses and telephone 
numbers, employment addresses and phone numbers and income within twenty-four (24) hours of any 
change. 
16. Respondent should be ordered to pay Petitioner child support of $297.36, based on 
Petitioner's gross monthly income of $9,000, and Respondent's gross monthly of $5,000, beginning January, 
2005. Respondent should make the child support payment in one monthly installment, due on the first day 
of each month. 
17. Respondent's obligation to pay child support will continue until such time as Gabriel reaches 
eighteen years of age or graduates from high school during his normal and expected year of graduation, 
whichever occurs later. 
18. Respondent's child support obligation should be subject to mandatory income withholding, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-3, 62A-11-403 and 62A-11-404.5. 
19. The parties should share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses 
for Gabriel, including dental, optical, psychological, prescriptions, deductibles and co-payments, beginning 
3 
as of the date of separation. A parent who incurs health and dental expenses must provide written 
verification of the cost and payment of health and dental expenses to the other parent within thirty days of 
payment. Payment would then be due within ten days after receipt. 
20. If either party decides to move out of the state of Utah or more than 50 miles from their 
current residences, he or she should provide 60 days advance written notice to the other party. 
21. The parties should share equally the costs of Gabriel's child care center, which is at present 
$525 per month. The parties should pay their one-half shares directly to the service provider. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO TAXES 
22. Petitioner should have the right to claim Gabriel as a tax exemption each year. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO ALIMONY 
23. The parties are each self-sufficient and able to provide for their own support. Accordingly, 
neither party should receive or pay alimony. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO REAL PROPERTY 
24. The marital home located at 1892 East Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah, 84020, should be 
awarded to Petitioner, along with the indebtedness thereon. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO PERSONAL PROPERTY 
25. Respondent should be awarded his personal effects, any gifts and inheritances he received 
during the marriage, any personal property in his possession, including the Saab automobile, provided he 
pay the indebtedness thereon. Respondent should be ordered to refinance the Saab into his own name within 
30 days. Petitioner should be awarded her personal effects, any gifts, inheritances and personal injury 
settlements, she received during the marriage, the Hundai automobile, and the remaining personal property. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
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26. With the exception of the Saab indebtedness, each party should be ordered to pay the debts 
and obligations in his or her own names, without contribution from the other. Each party should be solely 
responsible for the debts and obligations incurred after the date of separation. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO RESTRAINING ORDER 
27. Respondent should be restrained from coming to Petitioner's place of residence. The parties 
should exchange the minor child in public places. Respondent is permitted to telephone the Petitioner at 
reasonable times but only for the purposes pertaining to the minor child. 
PROVISIONS RELATING TO ATTORNEYS' FEES 
28. If this matter is contested, Respondent should be ordered to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees 
and court costs. If this matter is uncontested, the parties should share equally the attorney's fees and court 
costs incurred by both in connection with this proceeding. 
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MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
29. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other all documents necessary 
to carry out the terms of the Decree of Divorce. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows: 
1. For a Decree of Divorce severing the bonds of matrimony existing between Petitioner and 
Respondent, consistent with the Complaint for Divorce detailed above; 
2. For such further relief as may be just and equitable. 
Dated: December 20, 2004 
I Gayanpe Ki Schmid\ 
\ . Attorney foi\Petitiondr 
Petitioner's Address: 
1892 East Deep Woods Drive 
Draper, Utah, 84020 
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TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S VERIFIED ANSWER 
TO PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR 
DIVORCE AND RESPONDENT'S 
COUNTER PETITION 
Civil No. 044907342 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
COMES NOW RESPONDENT, Travis Paul Johnson, by and through counsel, Samuel 
M. Barker and Answers Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce ("Complaint") fails to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted. 
r ' L E D 
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SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
2. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 2 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
3. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
4. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
5. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
6. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 6 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
7. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
8. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 8 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
9. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 9 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
10. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 10 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
11. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of Petitioner's 
Complaint and affirmatively states that Respondent has been primarily responsible for caring for 
Gabriel and is the most closely bonded parent to Gabriel. Accordingly, it is in Gabriel's best 
interest that Respondent be awarded sole legal and physical custody of Gabriel. 
12. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 of Petitioner's 
Complaint and affirmatively states that Petitioner should be awarded such reasonable parent-time 
with Gabriel as the parties may agree, which at minimum should conform with the statutory 
visitation guidelines. 
13. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 13 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
14. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 14 of Petitioner's 
Complaint and affirmatively states that Petitioner should be responsible for picking Gabriel up at 
the beginning of his time-sharing and returning him to day care, school or his home, whichever is 
appropriate, at the end of her time sharing. 
15. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 15 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
16. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 16 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
17. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 17 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
18. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 18 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
19. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 19 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
20. Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph 20 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
21. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 21 of Petitioner's 
Complaint and affirmatively states that Petitioner does not work. However, Petitioner should 
pay one-half of the costs of Gabriel's childcare expenses incurred by Respondent. 
22. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 22 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
23. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 23 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
24. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 24 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
25. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 25 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
26. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 26 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
27. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 27 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
28. Respondent denies the allegations contained in paragraph 28 of Petitioner's 
Complaint. 
29. Respondent denies any and all allegations not specifically heretofore admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The Respondent further states that the facts of this case give rise to other defenses and 
therefore, the Respondent does now plead affirmatively each and every defense set forth in Rule 
8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure so that such defenses are preserved. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce, Respondent 
prays that Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce be dismissed and that Petitioner take nothing 
thereby. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Respondent counter petitions against Petitioner and alleges as follows: 
Provisions Relating to Jurisdiction 
1. Both Petitioner and Respondent are bona fide residents of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. The parties resided in the marital relationship in the State of Utah or Petitioner in 
the State of Utah committed the acts complained of by Respondent and, therefore, this Court has 
long-arm jurisdiction over Petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24(6) (1953 as 
amended). 
3. Petitioner and Respondent were married on October 4, 2002, in Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and are presently married. The parties separated on or about 
October 19, 2004. 
Provisions Relating to Grounds 
4. During the course of the marriage the parties have experienced difficulties that 
cannot be reconciled that have prevented the parties from pursuing a viable marriage 
relationship. 
Provisions Relating to the Children of the Parties 
5. There has been one (1) child born as issue of this marriage to wit: GABRIEL 
GOLDEN JOHNSON, born January 1, 2003. 
6. Pursuant to Rule 100(a)(1), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent 
states, upon information and belief, that there are no proceedings for custody of the above-named 
minor child filed or pending in the Juvenile Court. 
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act 
7. Utah has jurisdiction to make child custody and parent-time determinations 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c et seq. (1953 as amended) in that: 
a. Utah is the home state of the minor child at the time of commencement of 
this proceeding. 
b. Said minor child currently resides with Petitioner in Salt Lake County. 
c. Respondent has not participated, as a party or witness in any other 
capacity, in any other proceeding concerning the custody of or visitation/parent time with 
the child. 
d. Respondent has no information of any proceedings that could affect the 
current proceeding, including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to 
domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions. 
e. Respondent does not know of any person not a party to these proceedings 
who has physical custody of the child or who claims rights of legal custody or physical 
custody of, or parent-time with the child. 
Child Custody and Parent-Time 
8. Respondent should be awarded the permanent care, custody, and control of the 
minor child of the parties. 
9. Petitioner should be awarded rights of parent-time with the minor child of the 
parties as follows, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5: 
Reasonable parent-time should be as the parties agree. If the parties do not agree, the 
following schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the 
noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled: 
Minimum schedule for parent-time for children under five years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children under five years old. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be 
considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be 
entitled: 
(a) for children under five months of age: 
(i) six hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the noncustodial parent 
preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child; and 
(ii) two hours on holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) through (i) 
preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other environment familiar 
to the child; 
(b) for children five months of age or older, but younger than ten months of age: 
(i) nine hours of parent-time per week to be specified by the court or the noncustodial parent 
preferably: 
(A) divided into three parent-time periods; and 
(B) in the custodial home, established child care setting, or other environment familiar to the 
child; and 
(ii) two hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) through 
(i) preferably in the custodial home, the established child care setting, or other environment 
familiar to the child; 
(c) for children ten months of age or older, but younger than 18 months of age: 
(i) one eight hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(ii) one three hour visit per week to be specified by the noncustodial parent or court; 
(iii) eight hours on the holidays and in the years specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) 
through (i); and 
(iv) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week; 
(d) for children 18 months of age or older, but younger than three years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the noncustodial 
parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day outside his regular place 
of residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice to the custodial parent, pick up 
the child from the caregiver at an earlier time and return him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time may be: 
(A) two one-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(B) one week shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining week shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent consistent with 
these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical one-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week; 
(e) for children three years of age or older, but younger than five years of age: 
(i) one weekday evening between 5:30 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. to be specified by the noncustodial 
parent or court; however, if the child is being cared for during the day outside his regular place 
of residence, the noncustodial parent may, with advance notice to the custodial parent, pick up 
the child from the caregiver at an earlier time and return him to the custodial parent by 8:30 p.m.; 
(ii) alternative weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 6 
p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; 
(iii) parent-time on holidays as specified in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(c) through (i); 
(iv) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(A) two two-week periods, separated by at least four weeks, at the option of the noncustodial 
parent; 
(B) one two-week period shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; 
(C) the remaining two-week period shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; and 
(D) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time for 
vacation; and 
(v) brief phone contact with the noncustodial parent at least two times per week. 
(3) A parent shall notify the other parent at least 30 days in advance of extended parent-time 
or vacation weeks. 
(4) Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
Minimum schedule for parent-time for children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following schedule shall be 
considered the minimum parent-time to which the noncustodial parent and the child shall be 
entitled: 
(a) (i) one weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 
p.m. until 8:30 p.m.; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday from the time the child's school is 
regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the court directs the application of Subsection 
(2)(a)(i); 
(b) (i) alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the entry of the decree from 
6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, from the time the child's school is regularly 
dismissed on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, unless the court directs the application of Subsection 
(2)(b)(i); 
(c) holidays take precedence over the weekend parent-time, and changes shall not be made to 
the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time schedule; 
(d) if a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial parent shall be 
responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
(e) (i) if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total holiday period 
extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the parent is free from work, 
the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period; or 
(ii) at the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a scheduled holiday weekend 
may begin from the time the child's school is regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday 
weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day of the holiday weekend; 
(f) in years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following 
holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the 
birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the 
holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely 
entitled; 
(iii) spring break or Easter holiday beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out for the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the 
holiday; and 
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3 )(b) 
plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as the entire holiday is equally 
divided; 
(g) in years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled to the following 
holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the 
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Washington and Lincoln Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Monday 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is 
completely entitled; 
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday; 
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(v) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 
p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of 
time to which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation, including New Year's Day, as 
defined in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so long 
as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
(h) the custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even years and the even year 
holidays in odd years; 
(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every year beginning at 9 
a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 
a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(k) extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial parent; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the custodial parent 
consistent with these guidelines; 
(1) the custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of uninterrupted time during 
the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation; 
(m) if the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's extended parent-
time shall be 1/2 of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the custodial parent 
has holiday and phone visits; 
(n) notification of extended parent-time or vacation weeks with the child shall be provided at 
least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
(o) telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for reasonable duration. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by either parent 
concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and made a part of the parent-time 
order. 
10. Petitioner should responsible for picking up the minor child at the beginning of 
Petitioner's scheduled time-sharing period and returning the minor child to daycare, school or 
home, whichever is appropriate, at the end of her scheduled time-sharing period. 
11. The parties should provide each other with current residential addresses and 
telephone numbers, employment addresses and employment telephone numbers and income 
within twenty-four (24) hours of any change. 
Provisions Relating to Relocation 
12. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-37, in the event that either parent decides to 
move from the state of Utah or 150 miles or more from the residence at the time of the decree, 
that parent shall provide if possible 60 days advance written notice of the intended relocation to 
the other parent. The written notice of relocation shall contain statements affirming a parent-
time schedule approved by both parties that will be followed after the relocation and that neither 
parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant to the schedule approved by both 
parties. The relocating party shall be responsible for all the child's travel expenses relating to 
holiday parent-time and one-half (1/2) of the child's travel expenses relating to extended parent-
time. In the event that the parties are unable to agree on a parent-time schedule the schedule in 
the relocation statute should be followed after the relocation. 
Provisions Relating to Support Payments 
13. Respondent is not employed and has no source of income. Prior to the parties' 
separation, Respondent was a full-time father and caregiver to the parties' minor child. 
14. Petitioner is unemployed but received income in excess of $ 10,001.00 per month 
from a settlement and investments. 
15. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 et seq. (1953 as amended), Petitioner 
should be ordered to pay child support to Respondent to commence January 2005, the month of 
the filing of this Counter Petition as follows: 
a. The sum of $826.00 per month as base support for the minor child of the 
parties pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines until said child becomes 18 
years of age, or has graduated from high school during the child's normal and expected 
year of graduation, whichever occurs later (see child support worksheet attached hereto 
as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference). 
b. The base child support award shall be reduced by 25% for time periods 
during which the child is with the noncustodial parent for at least 12 days out of 30 
consecutive days. The base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for time 
periods during which the child is with the noncustodial parent for at least 25 out of 30 
consecutive days. This provision does not apply if the visit was a "normal" parent-time 
or holiday visits with the noncustodial parent. However, "normal" parent-time and 
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of the 
consecutive day requirement. 
c. If the Office of Recovery Services is collecting child support, the 
noncustodial parent must submit written documentation to the Office of Recovery 
Services, verifying the dates of the visit and either a court order or written agreement of 
the parties concerning that visit. If the noncustodial parent is current in all child support 
obligations, a refund will be given to the noncustodial parent within one month after the 
visit, or after the documentation has been received by the Office of Recovery Services, 
whichever is last. 
d. The obligee (custodial parent) shall be entitled to immediate and automatic 
income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11 Parts 4 and 5 (1953 as 
amended). This income withholding procedure applies to existing and future payors, and 
all withheld income shall be submitted to the Office of Recovery Services. 
e. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.5, all monthly payments of child 
support, maintenance or alimony provided in the order or decree shall be due on the first 
day of each month, unless otherwise specified. 
f. All administrative fees and costs of income withholding assessed by the 
Office of Recovery Services shall be paid by Petitioner in addition to the base child 
support obligation. 
g. All child support payments should be made to the Office of Recovery 
Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0011, unless the Office of 
Recovery Services gives notice that payments should be sent elsewhere. 
h. The issue of child support arrearages may be determined by further 
judicial or administrative determination. 
i. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.4 and 7.7, each parent's child 
support obligation shall be established in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes. The 
child support obligation of the father shall be $0. The child support obligation of the 
mother shall be $826.00 (see child support worksheet attached as Exhibit "A"). Except 
during periods of court-ordered visitation, if physical custody of the child changes from 
that assumed in the original order, the parent without physical custody shall be required 
to pay the amount of support set forth in this paragraph without the need to modify this 
order to the parent who has physical custody, to a relative to whom physical custody of 
the child has been voluntarily given, or to the state if the child is in state custody. 
j . Enforcement of a child support order may be pursued at any time within 
four years after the date the child reaches majority. 
Provisions Relating to Health Insurance 
16. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.15 (1953 as amended), Petitioner should 
maintain insurance for medical expenses for the benefit of the minor child. 
a. Petitioner shall receive a credit toward her child support obligation, for 
health insurance premiums she actually pays to provide coverage for the child, even if 
another adult in Petitioner's household pays the premium. 
b. The child's portion of the premium shall be calculated by dividing the 
premium amount by the number of persons covered under the policy. 
c. Both parties should share equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured 
medical expenses, including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the minor child 
and actually paid by the parties. 
d. The parent ordered to maintain insurance should provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the 
Social Security Act, upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on 
or before January 2, of each calendar year. The parent should notify the other parent, or 
the Office of Recovery Services, of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits 
within 30 calendar days of the date that parent first knew or should have known of the 
change. 
e. A parent who incurs medical expenses should provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of 
payment. 
f. A parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive 
credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent 
fails to comply with the Subparagraphs "d" and "e" above. 
g. The parent to whom written verification is provided should reimburse the 
parent who incurred the medical expenses one-half of the amount of the out-of-pocket 
costs within 30 days of receipt of the written verification. 
Provisions Relating to Child Care Expenses 
17. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.16 (1953 as amended), both parties should 
share equally the reasonable work-related and career, or occupational training-related childcare 
expenses incurred by Respondent. 
a. Petitioner should begin paying her share of childcare expenses on a 
monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the childcare expense. 
b. Respondent should provide written verification of the cost and identity of 
a childcare provider to Petitioner upon initial engagement of a provider and thereafter on 
the request of Petitioner. Respondent should notify Petitioner of any change of childcare 
provider or the monthly expense of childcare within 30 calendar days of the date of the 
change. Respondent may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to 
recover Petitioner's share of the expenses if Respondent fails to comply with these 
provisions. 
Provisions Relating to Life Insurance 
18. Petitioner should obtain a life insurance policy on Petitioner's life, so long as such 
is available at reasonable cost or through Petitioner's employer, in a face amount of sufficient 
size to provide for a monthly income equal to child support and alimony payments herein. 
Petitioner should maintain in full force and effect said life insurance policy until the support 
obligations herein terminate. During the period of the child's minority, Petitioner should 
irrevocably designate the parties' minor child as beneficiary on said life insurance and designate 
Respondent as the trustee for said minor child. Thereafter, so long as the alimony obligation 
continues, Petitioner should irrevocably designate Respondent as beneficiary on said life 
insurance. 
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations 
19. Petitioner should assume and pay, and hold Respondent harmless from liability 
on, all debts and obligations incurred by the parties prior to their date of separation. Thereafter, 
Petitioner should assume and pay all debts and obligations incurred for a family purpose. 
Otherwise, all debts and obligations contracted by the parties should be the responsibility of the 
party who incurred the particular debt. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(c)(ii), the parties 
should notify respective creditors or obligees regarding the division of debts, obligations, or 
liabilities herein and the parties' separate, current addresses. 
Provisions Relating to Personal Property 
20. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties acquired certain items 
of personal property. Said personal property should be appraised by an independent appraiser 
and divided equitably between the parties. 
Provisions Relating to Real Property 
21. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired certain real property to 
wit: 
a. A home located at 1892 Deep Woods Drive, Draper, Utah 84020, more 
particularly described as follows: Lot 36 OAK VISTA 1 AT SUNCREST Sec 3409. 
b. Said real property should be sold as soon as reasonably practicable and the 
proceeds of the sale should be applied as follows: 
i. First, pay expenses of sale; 
ii. Second, retire any and all mortgages and liens; 
iii. Third, pay all marital debts and obligations; 
iv. Last, the balance remaining thereafter to be divided equally 
between the parties. 
c. Both parties should execute any necessary documents for the listing and 
sale of said real property. In the event the Respondent fails to execute said documents, 
Petitioner may submit an ex parte motion, pursuant to Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the Court may direct the clerk of the court to execute said necessary 
documents. 
* IS THERE ANY OTHER LAND? 
Provisions Relating to Alimony 
22. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, Respondent should be awarded a sum of 
$3,000.00 per month as alimony from Petitioner for a period two (2) years, equal to the length of 
the marriage. Petitioner and Respondent were married on October 4, 2002. 
a. Petitioner has an ability to provide support to Respondent as requested 
herein. Petitioner has monthly income in excess of $ 10,001.00 per month. 
b. Respondent has need of monthly financial support as Respondent has not 
worked during the parties' marriage and was a stay-at-home father providing full-time 
care for the parties' minor child. 
c. Payment of alimony to Respondent by Petitioner will restore Respondent 
to the standard of living that existed at the time of the parties' separation. 
d. Unless the Decree of Divorce specifically provides otherwise, the order of 
alimony automatically terminates upon the remarriage of the spouse receiving alimony or 
the establishment by the paying spouse that the receiving spouse is cohabiting with 
another person, including living together in a homosexual relationship sharing expenses. 
Provisions Relating to Financial Accounts 
23. Petitioner has financial accounts or other investment fund accounts. Respondent 
should be awarded one-half of all benefits accrued pursuant to such accounts during the period of 




24. Respondent should be restrained from coming to Petitioner's place of residence. 
The parties should exchange the minor child in public places. Respondent is permitted to 
telephone the Petitioner at reasonable times but only for the purposes pertaining to the minor 
child. 
Taxes 
25. Respondent should be entitled to claim the parties1 minor child as an exemption 
for the purposes of filing federal and state income tax returns. 
Attomev!s Fees 
26. Petitioner should be ordered to pay Respondent's attorney's fees in a sum of not 
less that $2,000.00. 
Other 
27. Petitioner should be restored the use of her former name, CAMILLE 
CASTILLO, if she so desires. 
28. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other such documents 
as are required to implement the provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
29. The Court should grant such other and further relief as it may deem just and 
appropriate in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays that a Decree of Divorce be granted pursuant to the 
terms set forth in Respondent's Counter Petition. 
DATED this W day of J ^ ^ 2005. 
SMART, SCHOFIELD, SHORTER & LUNCEFORD 
Samuel M. Barker 
Attorney for Respondent 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
):ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Travis Paul Johnson (Affiant), being first duly sworn and under oath, deposes and says 
that Affiant is the Respondent in the above-entitled action; that Affiant has read the foregoing 
Verified Answer to Petitioner's Complaint for Divorce and Respondent's Counter Petition, and 
understands the contents thereof, and the same is true of Affiant's own knowledge, information 
and belief. 
/ . (As*-* 
Travis Paul Johnson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this )A day of C3JJMUflg>J 2005. 
A JILL CAMPBELL 
NOTARY PUBUC - STATE OF UTAH 
657 EAST GARFIELD AVE 
SAUIAKEOTY, UT 84105 
HyComm.Exp. c 
EXHIBIT "A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 




TRAVIS PAUL JOHNSON, 
Respondent. 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY) 
Civil No. 044907342 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and father for whom 
support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to instructions for 
definition of income. 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do not enter alimony 
ordered for this case.) 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations ordered for the 
children in Line I.) 
2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in Present Home 
Worksheet for either parent. 
Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a. This is the Adjusted Gross Income for child 
support purposes. 
Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and number of children in Line 1 to the 
support Table. Find the Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 by the COMBINED 




Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of the Base 
Support Obligation. 
$826.00 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amounts) from the Low 
Income Table per U.C.A. 78-45-7.7. The parents) without physical custody of the 
child(ren) pay(s) the amounts) all 12 months of the year. 
Which parent is the obligor? X Mother Father Both 
Is the support award the same as the guideline amount(s) in Line 7? (X) Yes ( ) No 
If No, enter the amount(s) ordered: $ (Father) $ (Mother), and answer number 10. 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the Deviation? 
( ) Property settlement 
( ) Excessive debts of marriage 
( ) Absence of need of the custodial parent 
Attorney Bar No._ 6073 ( ) Electronic Filing (X) Manual Filing 
6/2000 
i l l day ofOdh 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this I Q  of v j ( 3 » » 2005,1 deposited in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing VERIFIED ANSWER TO 
PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE AND RESPONDENT'S COUNTER 
PETITION to: 
Gayanne K. Schmid 
68 South Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Travis Paul Johnson 
c/o Christina Williams 
9300 South Redwood Road, #16-04 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
ADDENDUM 3 
MAIL PAYMENTS TO: 
P.O. Box 58025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158-0025 
Phone (801) 481-8800 Universii 
OF UTAH 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
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CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 
DRAPER UT 84020-5503 09/01/04 09/30/04 
09/01 ID 01 PRIME SHARES Balance Forward 
09/01 Deposit Dividend Tiered Rate 
Annual Percentage Yield Earned 
09/30 Ending Balance 
Dividends Paid Year to Date 
A Tiered Rate Dividend of $1.32 
0.80% from 08/01/04 through 
will be posted on 10/01/04 
2012.15 
1.38 2013 . 53 
08/31/04 
2013.53 










02 GABRIEL GOLDEN Bal 




Dividends Paid Yea 




















































































Yield Earned 0.80% from 08/01/04 
r To Share 90 
r to Date 




Yield Earned 0.25% from 08/01/04 
#738613 
8 HOLIDAY OIL255 E 
6119.28 
4 . 16 6123.44 
through 08/31/04 
5500.00- 623.44 
623 . 44 
22 . 64 
0/01/04 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * • * * * * * * * * * * : 
6644 . 47 
1.83 6646.30 
through 08/31/04 
8 . 89- 6637.41 
ard 
86688600486 PC PARKING METER PARK 
#264335 
12300 S. DRAPER UT 
#002369 










6351 . 14 
6300 . 74 
6291 . 74 
6269.99 
ATM Fee 







ed on f 
#048065 









5824 . 74 
5799.24 
5583.66 
5577 . 04 
000148 
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1 8 2 7 0 2 8 
CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 
DRAPER UT 84020-5503 09/01/04 09/30/04 
SALT LAKE ROASTING SALT LAKE 
USPS 4977880004 SALT 
MODERN DISPLAY SALT 






09/03 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/01 24761974246275245010431 FAZOLIS #5225 DRAPER 
09/03 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/01 24610434246072001199161 BLOCKBUSTER VIDEO #49057 
09/03 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/02 24401404246001354002017 
09/03 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/02 24717054247122479678845 
09/03 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/01 24717054246602460274770 
09/03 Withdrawal Transfer 
To CASTILLO-JOHNSON 1939679 
09/03 Draft 000523 
09/07 09/05 Withdrawal at ATM #031317 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper 
09/07 09/05 Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper 
09/07 09/05 Withdrawal at ATM #222711 
POS PETCO #0264 6842 S REDWOOD 
JORDAN UT 
:09/07 09/05 Withdrawal at ATM #000075 
POS OFFICE DEPOT WEST JORDAN UT 
09/07 Draft 000387 
Processed Check - CAPITAL ONE 
TYPE: CHECK PYMT 
09/07 Draft 000388 
Processed Check - CAPITAL ONE 
TYPE: CHECK PYMT 
09/07 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/03 24223694249980215139416 
09/07 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/05 24625124250441549502553 
09/07 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/02 24223694247980215136158 
09/07 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/02 24254774247456738000884 
09/07 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/02 24721854248024703398420 
09/07 Withdrawal Debit Card 







LAKE CIT UT 
161.20-













PIZZA PIPELINE SALT LAKE CIT 
CHEVRON 00301989 DRAPER UT 











TACO BELL #05139 MIDVALE UT 





5553 . 54 











3 8 5 3.44 
3843 . 91 
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CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 


























2 5150 WESTRIDGE 
PREMIER CR CARD 
09/02 24071054247489195777734 LIBRARY STORE, THE SALT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/05 24 610434250004062535671 PARTY CITY #435 W JORDAN 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/03 24399004248512010106349 FIRESTONE 00106344 SANDY 
Deposit Transfer From Share 02 
Draft 000576 
Cashed Draft 000576 
Withdrawal at ATM #001300 
ATM USANA AMPHITHEATER 2 5150 WESTRIDGE 
BLVD. WEST VALLEY UT 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM USANA AMPHITHEATER 






Withdrawal ATT WS 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/07 24493984252200999600067 
Withdrawal at ATM #404075 









TYPE: CHK ORDER 
Withdrawal MCI 800 
TYPE: THANK YOU 
Withdrawal QUESTAR GAS CO. 
TYPE: QGC 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/08 24493984252170559400374 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
Continued on following page -
FOREVER YOUNG SANDY UT 
12300 S. DRAPER UT 
AMERICAN 
• 4 4 4 - 3 3 3 3 
ALBERTO'S MURRAY UT 
AKE C I T UT 
1 3 0 . 0 8 -
C I T Y UT 
1 8 4 . 2 2 -
UT 
5 5 0 0 . 0 0 
2 6 0 . 0 0 -
6 1 . 7 5 -
1 . 0 0 -
1 4 0 1 . 3 0 -
4 5 . 8 0 -
2 6 . 0 0 -
1 4 3 . 2 4 -
3 6 . 1 7 -
7 4 . 9 7 -
1 6 1 . 0 0 -
2 7 3 . 2 7 -
1 0 5 . 3 9 -
3 0 . 8 7 -
3 1 0 . 4 1 -
7 3 . 0 0 -
7 0 . 0 0 -
2 0 . 9 9 -
7 9 . 3 8 -
2 6 2 . 0 0 -
1 5 . 2 0 -
24 . 9 8 -
3 6 3 0 
3 4 4 6 
8 9 4 6 
8 6 8 6 
8 6 2 4 
8 6 2 3 
7 2 2 2 
7 1 7 6 
7 1 5 0 
7 0 0 7 
6 9 7 1 
6 8 9 6 
6 7 3 5 . 
6 4 6 1 . 
6 3 5 6 . 
6 3 2 5 . 
6 0 1 5 . 
5 9 4 2 . 
5 8 7 2 . 
5 8 5 1 . 
5 7 7 1 . 
5 5 0 9 . 
5 4 9 4 . 
5 4 6 9 . 
. 60 
, 3 8 
. 3 8 
. 3 8 
. 6 3 
. 6 3 
. 3 3 
. 5 3 
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Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/08 2416407425262105327 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/07 2441800425225207464 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/07 2461043425200407586 
Withdrawal Transfer 










Deposit by Check 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/09 2405523425400094940 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/10 2449398425517002060 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/11 2462512425544158344 
Withdrawal at ATM #003567 
POS WILDOATS 400 S 700 E 
2199 GGW VIDEO 800-689 
5686 MINIATURE MARK003 
5805 THE BUCKLE #277 S 
6772 WET SEAL #835 SAN 
39679 Share 90 
3666 CA 
28.18- 5441 
















1939679 Share 90 
0081 CROWN BURGERS SAL 
1482 NEWSPAPER AGENCY 
2398 CHEVRON 00301989 DRAPER UT 





Withdrawal Debit Card 




Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/14 24254774259456689500655 TACO BELL #15331 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/15 24224434260304162300141 PIBS EXCHANGE LC 











500 . 00- 887.51 
24682.35 25569.86 
8.23- 25561.63 
T LAKE CIT UT 
23.48- 25538.15 
CORP 801-237-2800 UT 
28.33- 25509.82 




16. 87- 24805.06 
87 . 84- 24717.22 
ITY CNTR SALT LAKE CTY UT 




SALT LAKE CIT UT 
16. 30- 16794.57 
SALT LAKE CIT UT 
2, 850 
000J51 
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I DEPOSfT 
TOTAL 
1 8 2 7 0 2 8 
CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 





















Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/15 24493984260170043200091 DECADES SALT LAKE CIT UT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/15 24717054260122606833075 PAPER CREATIONS SALT LAKE 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/14 24403694259900425900067 EXPRESS RENTALS INC MURRAY 
Withdrawal at ATM #817080 
POS SMITHS 212 E. 12300 S. DRAPER UT 
Withdrawal at ATM #017736 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal at ATM #024677 
POS KMART 1055 E DRAPER PARKWAY DRAPER UT 
Draft 000394 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/15 24254774260456689500553 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/16 24755414260642606819880 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/15 24072804260456000226693 
Withdrawal at ATM #002352 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Draft 000579 
Withdrawal at ATM #982702 
ATM M274-MT VIEW-39077 HWY 410 & 7TH 
MOUNTAIN VIEW WY 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM M274-MT VIEW-39077 HWY 410 & 7TH 
MOUNTAIN VIEW WY 
Withdrawal at ATM #008932 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal at ATM #941431 
POS HOLIDAY OIL #38 HOLIDAY OIL255 E 
TRAVER DRAPER UT 
Deposit AIG RPS 301 
















LAKE CIT UT 
101. 75-
1.00-
TEN THOUSAND VILLAGES UTA 









16470 . 61 
16469 . 61 
16438.77 
15534 . 67 
15529. 55 











14832 . 27 
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CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 





















TYPE: ELECTRIC C 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/17 24717054261732610701529 SUPERSONIC 33RD 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/17 24455014261040006288501 BENEDICT'S TRUE 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/18 24455014262040007267057 BENEDICT'S TRUE 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/16 24792624261221028600471 RUBY TUESDAY #21 
Withdrawal at ATM #022070 
POS PETSMART Sandy UT 
Withdrawal at ATM #115634 
POS WAL-MART #2307 10425 SO STATE ST SANDY 
UT 
Withdrawal at ATM #003445 
POS ALBERTSONS #0394 11479 SOUTH STATE 
STREE DRAPER UT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/20 24337894264296005458562 DEPT OF MOTOR VE 
Withdrawal at ATM #249590 
POS HOLIDAY OIL #38 HOLIDAY OIL255 E 
TRAVER DRAPER UT 
Withdrawal at ATM #028919 
POS KMART 1055 E DRAPER PARKWAY DRAPER UT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/20 24625124265441648419405 CHEVRON 00301989 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/20 24164074265743360280657 RADIO SHACK 0013 
Withdrawal at ATM #032622 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Draft 000580 
Cashed Draft 000580 
Withdrawal at ATM #027792 
POS KMART 1055 E DRAPER PARKWAY DRAPER UT 
Withdrawal at ATM #009524 
ATM HARRY O'S 427 S. MAIN ST PARK CITY UT 
Continued on following page 
216 . 58-
4 . 00-
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31.52-
VAL MOUNTAIN VIEW W^ 
44.66-
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48 .24-




















HICLE SALT LAKE CIT UT 




276. 97- 17963.99 
3512 DRAPER UT 
101.75- 17862.24 
1 . 00- 17861.24 
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CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 
DRAPER UT 84020-5503 09/01/04 09/30/04 
09/24 09/23 Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM HARRY O'S 427 S. MAIN ST PARK CITY UT 
09/24 Withdrawal at ATM #332015 
POS WET SEAL #290 64 SOUTH RIO GRANDE ST 
SALT LAKE CTY UT 
09/24 Draft 000551 
09/25 Withdrawal at ATM #027940 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
09/25 Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
09/27 09/26 Withdrawal at ATM #048823 
POS SUNCREST MARKET 14886 S. TRAVERSE 
RIDGE DRAPER UT 
09/27 09/26 Withdrawal at ATM #030816 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
09/27 09/26 Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
09/27 09/26 Withdrawal at ATM #178232 
POS HOLIDAY OIL #38 HOLIDAY OIL255 E 
TRAVER DRAPER UT 
09/27 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/25 24610434270072006809599 ARBY'S #223 Q52 DRAPER UT 
09/27 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/23 24493984268207099300391 
09/27 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/23 24323024268138014400019 
09/27 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/24 24418004269269145649609 
09/27 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/23 24625124269441675823319 
09/27 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/23 24323024268138016600244 
09/27 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/23 24164074268494274363422 
09/27 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/24 24792624269682090689217 
09/27 Withdrawal Transfer 
To CASTILLO-JOHNSON 1939679 
09/28 Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/27 24224434272323910300092 SALT LAKE 
Continued on following page 
1 . 00-














17292 . 98 








14 . 60- 16594.49 
THE COSTUME CLOSET SALT LAKE 
SOLE OUTDOORS #92 LENEXA KS 







THE COSTUME CLOSET SALT LAKE 
BORDERS BOOKS 01002740 






LAKE CIT UT 
200.00-
Share 90 
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Phone (801) 481-8800 
*ur sawift M*r«y«wuwrf » f 100400 
ONCUA 
Universi 
O F U T A H 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
PLEASE R E T U R N THIS PORTION W I T H YOUR PAYMENT OR DEPOSIT. 






1 8 2 7 0 2 8 
CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 



















Withdrawal at ATM #385447 
POS HOLIDAY OIL #38 HOLIDAY OIL255 
TRAVER DRAPER UT 
Withdrawal GMACM EPAYBILL 
TYPE: ONDEMAND 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/27 24492794272118000185821 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/28 24455014272720006395417 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/27 24492794272118000191639 CENTURY 16 12019 SALT LAKE 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/28 24717054273642732005962 ROMA RISTORANTE SL CITY UT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/28 24493984273639000002612 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
2 .32- 16128 . 04 
3005.97- 13122 
5.00- 13117 
CENTURY THEATR 12019 SALT LAKE CIT UT 
6.13- 13110 





PARTY AMERICA #2201 SALT LAKE CIT UT 
360.70- 12646 
09/25 24270764272318014490230 EMBASSY SUITES HOTEL SALT LAKE CIT UT 
Withdrawal at ATM #008079 40.00- 12606 
ATM University of Utah CU 50 North Medical 
Drive Salt Lake UT 
Withdrawal Transfer 
To CASTILLO-JOHNSON 1939679 Share 90 
Withdrawal at ATM #021965 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal at ATM #394015 
POS ALBERTSONS 1212 E. 12200 S. DRAPER UT 
Deposit AIG RPS 301 
TYPE: ANNUITYPAY 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/29 24625124273441701722745 CHEVRON 00301989 DRAPER UT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/28 24072804273456000161663 JOANN FABRIC #1444 SALT LAKE CIT UT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 137.00- 17453 
09/28 24661004273120272010081 GALEN V CAMPBELL DDS SALT LAKE CTY UT 
Ending Balance 17453 
Dividends Paid Year to Date 43.08 
A Tiered Rate Dividend of $2.79 will be posted on 10/01/04 




























MAIL PAYMENTS TO: 
P.O. Box 58025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158-0025 
Phone (801) 481-8800 Universi 
O F U T A H 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT OR DEPOSIT. 
I LOAN PAYMENT 
I SUFRX 
I CHECKWG | DEPOSIT 
I REG. SAVINGS | DEPOSIT 
TOTAL 
1 8 2 7 0 2 8 
CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 
DRAPER UT 84020-5503 10/01/04 10/31/04 
10/01 ID 01 PRIME SHARES Balance Forward 
10/01 Deposit Dividend Tiered Rate 
Annual Percentage Yield Earned 
10/31 Ending Balance 
Dividends Paid Year to Date 
A Tiered Rate Dividend of $1.37 
2013.53 
1 . 32 2014 . 85 
0.80% frcm 09/01/04 through 09/30/04 
2014.85 
8 . 94 
will be posted on 11/01/04 
*****************************************************^ ***** ^  






















ID 02 GABRIEL GOLDEN Balance Forward 
Deposit Dividend Tiered Rate 
Annual Percentage Yield Earned 0.72% from 09/01/04 
Ending Balance 
Dividends Paid Year to Date 
A Tiered Rate Dividend of $0.27 will be posted on 1 
********************************************************* 








Withdrawal at ATM 
ATM Holiday Oil 3 
Withdrawal ATM Fe 


















Yield Earned 0.25% from 09/01/04 
T 
Card 
072021307179 DANSKIN #12 DRAPER UT 
Card 
286599200048 MEMORY LANE PAPER CO OREM UT 
#007145 
8 Draper UT 
e 
8 Draper UT 
Card 
072001548369 BLOCKBUSTER VIDEO #49 
Card 





23 . 65 
1/01/04 










562922120118 WASATCH PIZZA MIDTOWN 
Card 
916031273587 BIG LOTS #04130004130 
95 
26.64- 17229 






#1 SALT LAKE CIT UT 
96.64- 16635 





















MAIL PAYMENTS TO: 
P.O. Box 58025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158-0025 
Phone (801) 481-8800 
ONCUA 
Universi 
O F U T A H 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT OR DEPOSIT. 







1 8 2 7 0 2 8 
CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 












































Point of Purchase Check - PRINTS 











Point of Purchase Check - DANCING 
Terminal City & State - SALT UT 
TYPE: EFT 
Withdrawal MCI 800-444-3333 
TYPE: THANK YOU 
Deposit by Check 
Withdrawal 
Withdrawal Transfer 














































































































































MAIL PAYMENTS TO: 
P.O. Box 58025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158-0025 
Phone (801) 481-8800 
tour uMipa M m % •» 
ONCUA 
Universi 
O F U T A H 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT OR DEPOSIT. 




I REG. SAVINGS 
I OEPOSfT 
TOTAL 
1 8 2 7 0 2 8 
CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 
































Withdrawal EXPRESS RECOVERY 
TYPE: AUTOPAY 










































1939679 Share 90 
1939679 Share 90 
1939679 Share 90 
1939679 Share 90 
1939679 Share 90 









































1409 . 17 
1309.17 
1267.60 
1254 . 10 








600 . 84 























on following page 
2, 829 
000158 
MAIL PAYMENTS TO: 
PXX Box 58025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158-0025 
Phone (801) 481-8800 
ONCUA 
Universi 
O F U T A H 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT OR DEPOSIT. 




I REG.SAVNQS | DEPOSTT 
TOTAL 

















































Deposit by Check 
Withdrawal Transfer 








Point of Purchase Check - WALMART 



















To CASTILLO-JOHNSON 1939679 Sh< 
Deposit Transfer 














































































































































MAIL PAYMENTS TO: 
P.O. Box 58025 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158-0025 
Phone (801) 481-8800 Universi 
O F U T A H 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
PLEASE RETURN THIS PORTION WITH YOUR PAYMENT OR DEPOSIT. 
f LOAN PAYMENT 
I SUFRX 
I CHECWNG | DEPOSIT 
R E G L S A V M G S 
I DEPosrr 
TOTAL 
1 8 2 7 0 2 8 
CAMILLE R CASTILLO 
1892 DEEP WOODS DR 










Dividends Paid Year to 
A Tiered Rate Dividend 










45 . 87 
20018 . 17 
18349.73 
18312 . 42 













































































































* * * * * 
Amount 
50. 00 
12 . 79 
11. 58 
11237.50 
63 . 70 
9. 73 


















































94 . 96 


















































15 . 00 
13 . 00 























*******************************: *****: • * * * * * * * * T i 
Total Dividends Paid Year to Date 7 8 . 4 6 
2 , 8 3 1 
000160 
ADDENDUM 5 
K e c e i v e d U K U A K K ^ 8 2 0 0 6 1 4 : 1 3 
Membership Application and Account Information Card 
AN requested information must be comptoced and current 
to process this application. 
•Account Subject to i 10.00 fee If dosod within 1B0 days. 
Subject to approval by Membership Office*; 
f f f c t f i w r e f f v University of Utah Federal Credit Union 
S J a H J H / MS0 S. Highland Of'rvC Salt Ute City, Utah 84106 
C R E O I T U N I O N R0- Box S»25 Salt Lake Gtfc Utah WlSa-OOIS 
r
 ra* times ire Ofttr ~! 
Data (MM/D0/YY) HOW Old You H e r About UJ? 3 Radio J T.V. Q Website 
Q In Branch Adverting 3 Newspaper fe Referral 
[ Account Number (nontrarwfefi^tHar* account) 
frSis 
r (nontfe wfe<iP»a hra i 
Hctfion If For 
Savings 
• Money fund 
) t f Checking » ATM I Checkmate 
Q Certificates of Depotf • other. . 
APailCAUT IWPOttMATlOW 
in* i f nanDawaaaai 
=s=j | U\M d.Wbrfc QAttmdSdXrf Q Worst* Q f^elunbjer 
' Ualijd ai the IbadMiIng councy: 
'• DfsaftUI* OT&octe QSummit Q D M • Weber • Morgan 
Q Unbenfty Owt Union Qnptoyw 
Q lmm«dlata fimi»y mairiber of an e*sflng or etfgiofc member 
Q.5jwuMtfparaw 
Nam* (Rrst middle Initial, laat) 
iddrflK (MoPurofAnSMiddmi«l) Street A ress 
Ml. C^,Y|A9mfh fow 
Social Security Number [Otttt OT Birth (MM/DO/YY) 
1ST State zip Code ArarwfU.S.ClQ)anorP«rmar»fntR#»Vdani> 
Y e s O T N Q Q if NofvSMt** and expo 









WJ Sdf fcflWMMCdJ 
wsr Wfssr 
Employer T«tephOM With A m Cod* 
( ) 
^ame (Pint, middle initial, Ia4) 
n.sgn 
SOCHI SHUHCy NumlMr r*fo of Birth (MH/DO/YY) 
Straet Address Of &rti UM Co*** rw*fcaot h bam far mai*«rtlVRa6atlJi«C«*^ia^rBfmiMaior«W€dt 
(No Km cw« e<* anriMMMj / s ^ f c ^ ^ fy,y 
City [Stare [[Zip Coda 
Sy3m 
K>ft/?Q 
r e & NOQ 
evening Telephone With Ante OodollDi tl e Telephone WKh Area Code 
(fr>/)tnfe-//M life J )i7-7>7g'H 
Q W-» BtW Hym oompMad 
5tS5T zip code Halting Address ( If different fiom «met eddrasi) CRY 
E-Mail Hothan Maiden Nemo Bmptoyir 
I ."Wtlmotoy«j 
Employer Telephone With Area Code 
( ) 
•AYASXI ON OIATH AttlSKftflT -
VV^i»tabvo>taett(UMi*<r«»nMi»»^«»i««^ 
haco»diw»teuWQj*^w¥*^/*Mb<B»ma^ 
Name (First, middle inWat, teat) 






{jHp l>wt Ofttat a«i( M I O M ) 
State Zip Code 
?>p S^UfW 
Telephone With Area Code 
AaatuwfT Tnw« A W couoniONf 
I i»idy iraki appkaaM llv ( r« i r f« i^ 
wtfrad n t « tyajNtarttt corpcrattan; ma trtwnaiioapw^mlhbiealceiltt^ 
Uhlm to obtdh • ovAnawt fr«n a W paHV Ofdt m&*9 afwpfnhKSk^mft^OLWtCf^ 
ii i wra* m w v i i i i i rf^ABfi#A«,M A # W C K rmmt* AAaMTiamr • " •• r-— ; Vl t^C3«1!OCMAn<M^/ATieACCaMCAItO 
'-, w i * * umxmmikMW w w y / a i w #w.^«— MWHI I—m •••• i • m • 
i>i^a^uae^iWiii<aa>BiBittlri»aiaiaeyicniit<^ 
kauaiciMtieam^e^dijfitvaaiaoMiMTTwUr^^ ^ *UnkmiiiveaMdiadaiB 
Miobhita, ind e«at iiv vi» aireaoigre m ^ i * ihi 
tttariby c tfytM1 nl * 
•0a u ft fctfifvViSAeareattgr4fii»d^ in««reBH«iw«w»«Bi« 
OMolMiKSuvtttaai^  ATM/toaai Ajuwnt 
AUTrtOStnATlON 
1iomirai0t^v4^ir9lnp)i|«na^l«mVVfe*^^ >sH.C^T o i> S 1 
exnr njntfR ararakm of nv 
^OidtCai^Cc^r jK , 
^r Hie d n l t Union irtaaoCsf 
T i aMo»» 
<mpini<todafaft. 
fOT( 
: « f cwTincAnoN: 
in<ii«idioKe*dvv«iNial«ni»a<cairgrifci^ T ^ ^ 1 J - r ^ ^ ^ t t 2 t y M 1 
iotaKJupwW^uUr«ivuxiMiiri«Mirw —--7/*\(^; s_> ' ^ 5 "»*** 
r





by O dfr unJtttltejH e- jaiMaif 
|Q'Cr^X$y«wnsve>inad- SocMa^mrityIfaueOatas M a m b a r , . . _ „ u G . . 4 Joint . , 
uB«ngh> emptoy^ S #: ^Manao^rlnidaai ^ ^ E ^ fat!JJ_D17fji 
Uft4w*^ Cf«dl UnlM U to t ^ 0<)pcrtur^y Itndeb 
r«OTtyM4tf«dhyffi«teflnflaiC*Hf*lMmAfMiifei^^ Al rights « « i c M v d U w « 
i my montMy statement electron 
(l would like to be enrolled for direct < 
iD^prevadaod^mdnr iav lgHt t iMi i^v^hcMLi iuUK Tlrii Ci*dt w W K | 
— C w A Unon end l a >ugu V « Uid»fii*f ii t/ llflhr^Uty C/ idt Uoton. 
3 , 55 J l 
DO 
i 
) i \ i 1 1 R P 
MAI. PurmzHTs ra 
PJ1 Be* 54025 
eNCUA 
Universii 
C R E D I T U N I O N 




I FSB ftOMBS [ ULFUB1 
V I A 
1 9 3 9 6 7 9 
CAMTLLB R. C/LSTILLO-
1892 DEEP WOODS DR. 
CRAP2H UT 8402C 
:O3NS0K 
05/10/04 05/31/04 
05/10 ID 01 PRIME SHARES Balance forward 
n=,/io 
C5/L0 
f. c / ^  1 
Deposit Transfer 100C.00 
Trtr.m CASTILLO,CAMILLE 1827028 Share 90 
Lnding Balance 
Dividends Paid Yea* to Da.e 

















0 5 / 2 € 











** i thdraval 
Depcsi t 
K thdrawal 
W.1 i hdrawai 
Withdrawal at ATM 1416853 
RIM S U M OLSON 7 2 4 W'.ST 2 6 0 0 SOUT WOODS 
CROSS 0~T 
w i t h d r a w a l ATM 
iVTfel SLIM OLSOH 
CROSS UT 
E n d i n g B a l a n c e 
D i v i d e n d s P a i d 
Fee 
724 VTBST 2600 SODT WOODS 
Year to Date 
9 0 0 . 
2 0 0 . 
3 0 0 . 
3 0 0 . 
2 0 . 
4 0 . 
20 
3 ^ 0 0 




. 0 0 -
. 0 0 -
. 0 0 -
. 0 0 -
. 0 0 -
. 0 0 -
. 0 0 
. 0 0 -
. 0 0 -
. ^ 5 -
0 . 
9 0 0 . 
7 0 0 . 
4 0 0 . 
1 0 0 . 
8 0 . 
4 0 . 
2 0 . 
3 1 2 0 . 
1 2 0 , 
30 
3 6 . 
. 0 0 
. 0 0 
00 
. 0 0 
, 0 0 
. 0 0 
. 0 0 
. CO 
.CO 
. 0 0 






ToLa Dividends Paid Year to Date 0.3C 
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SdlL^kc G^p,UlakB< 1 
P t n e C»01) 4 8 V « 900 
&NGUA 
Vniversii 
C R E D I T U N F O N 
PLEASE BETU1W TMB VUKBOH HffTH TOW f*YI*3IT OR UhH&ll. 
1 9 3 9 6 7 9 
CAMtLLE R- CASTtM.O-JCdfcSO:* 
IS 9 2 DEEP WOODS I>R> 
UHAPLR UT 81020 06/01/04 G6/30/04 
DC/08 
3 6 / C B 
0 6 / C 3 
D 6 / 0 9 
0 6 / 0 9 
Cfe/09 












2, 64 ' 
Witndrawsl an ATH *B4R077 
?OS BOLIDAr OIL HOLIDAY OIL255 E TRAVEK 
DRAPER 3T 
Draft 003002 I 
Withdrawal at ATM 1001616 
ATM HOLIDAY OIL 17 293 '. 1230 3 £ DRAPER UT 
withdrawal ATM Tec 
ATH HOLIDAY OTf. 17 293 b 12330 S DRAPER UT 
withdrawal at ATM 1503 6 92 
ATM W,r.3 NORTH-TEMPLE! SALT LAKE CTX UT 
withdrawal AT« Fee 
ATM W.r.B NORTB-TF74PL&< SALT LAKH CTT OT 
Withdrawal at ATM 1340537 
POS HOLIDAY OIL HOLIDAY 01X255 C TRAVER 
DRAPPR C7 
Withdrawal at ATM 1302215 
ATM Z10HS-45T11 SOUTR BC 845 RAST 4500 
SOUTH SLC UT 
w i t h d r a w a l ATM F e e 
AfH ZIONS-45TH SOUTH. BC 8 4 5 EAST 4 5 0 0 
.SOUTH SLC UT 
WilhdxawAl Debit Cord 
06/09 246251241«>244C966463058 CbSVHQN 0C2O3195 DRAPER I7T 
withdrawal Debit Card 
C6/09 242707441613C430011C126 CCHTHMFO CERAKTC TTLE COR 0R2M 
Withdrawal at ATM I28557B 
^TM AMEX/EDS - Utah 3510 S Redwood Rd US 
West Valley C DT 
Withdrawal. ATM Tee 
ATM AKCX/^DS - Utah 3510 S Redwood Rd LS 
Wesl Vdllcy C UT 
Withdrawal at ATM I0275C9 ?i 
ATM Holiday Cil 38 Draper UT 
wllhcrawal ATM Fee 1 
ATM Jlcliday Cil AR Draper UT 
06/13 withdrawal at ATM 1019792 21 
ATM Holiday Cil 38 Craper UT 
0 6/13 Withdrawal ATM Fee 1 
ATM Holiday Oxl 38 Draper UT 
06/13 Withdrawal at ATM #015365 41 




























































1 ! /5. 96 




»*•«-PXk YWEWTS TO 
PCI. Ao iSBQgS 
&a* U * z Cfcy.ma* M 151-0625 
ONCUA 
Universii 
C R E D I T U N I O N 






CANJI.I,E R. CASIILLO-,TOHMSOM 
2 392 DCr.F WOODS DR. 
CRAPBR UT 64020 06/C1/04 C6/30/C4 
06/J 4 06/I J 
16/14 C6/13 
0 6/14 06/13 
06/14 06/tJ 












2, 648 O 
o 
o 
ATK KXTRA MART I86-"!67QC 5595 SOUTH 
REDWOOC ROAD TAY/LORSVJ LT.R U'f 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM EXTRA YJKRT I 8 6 - 3 6 " ' Q 6 1 ;595 SOUTH 
RKDWOOD ROAD T A Y X O R S V J LLL UT 
W i ' J i d r a w o l a t ATK I O 4 0 C 2 5 
A I M EXTRA MART § 8 0 - 3 6 3 9 3 1 7 3 0 0 
S A L T LAKE C 1 T UT 
W i t h d r a w a l ATM P e e 
ATM BXTRA MART # 8 0 - 3 6 . 1 9 3 1 2 3 0 0 
S A L T LAKE C I T OT 
W i t h d r a w a l a t ATM I C 4 0 0 6 3 
ATM EXTRA MAKT I 6 0 - 3 6 3 9 3 L 2 3 0 0 
SALT LAKE CTT UT 
W i t h d r a w a l ATM Fee 
ATK EXTRA MART 1 8 0 - 3 6 3 9 3 1 7 3 G C 
SALT LAXR CIT U? 
Withdrawal at ATM I0400'9 
ATM EXTRA MART #80-36393 123CO 
SALT LAKE ClT UT 
Withdrawal ATM >ee 
ATM hXTRA MART JBO-36393 12300 
SALT LAKE CET *JT 
Withdrawal Ue.oit Card 
06/11 24610434165C04092610472 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
06/10 2444500416J84375853284I 
WuhdrawaJ Debit Card 
06/11 24625124164440982812342 
Ki thdra^al Detjit Card 
06/11 244550l4163363<i21505660 
Withdrawal Deb5 t Card 
06/11 746104341650O4O9761C4fc4 
withdrawal Debit Card 
06/10 2461043*16107200710783/ 
Wtthd-awal Debit Card 
06/12 2462517416544096657:966 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
C6/10 24625124L63440975873443 
withdtawn) ~>ebit Card 
Continued on Eol lowing page. — 
L30Q B. 
33DC F. 
S. 1300 E. 











S. 1300 K. 
1 .CO-
S. 1200 E. 
4 .02-
7-EL3VCH 7 5116 K VALLEY CIT UT 
5.32-
SHTTHS IOOD M 1 3 3 SS6 SALT LAKE C7T 
6. 14-
CffKVRCN 0C3O190 9 DRAPER UT 
12 .76-
F7 19 MCDONALD'S SALT LAFF. CIT UT 
13.09-
/-BlEVTvN 25116 W VALLEY CIT UT 
13.74-
ARBY'S 1223 Q52 DRAPSR UT 
16-22-
CMEVROM 0 07C5 131 SALT LAKF. CTY OT 
70.21-

























MNL FATMBWT3 TOt 
PjGLBo* 9BB9B7S 
r»i—j (apt) *a v^aoq 
ONCUA 
Universii 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
fUBftSE FETUm IKS POCTION WTK TOUR f*TM9fT OR OBPCXTl. 
L 9 J 9 6 7 9 
CAH1LLK R. CASTILLO-J03NSOH 
L892 DEEP WOCOS DR. 
DRAPER ^T 64020 06/01/Ot 06/30/04 




) b / L 4 
J 6 / 1 4 









06/1C 24423634163843691256553 SMITH'S ¥333 SALT LAKE CTY t7T 
Withdrawal Debit Card 24-73- 1265.21 
06/12 24226454165983070806V70 PAPA JOKSS PIZZA SALT IAKS CXT UT 
withdrawal Debit Card 30.25- 1234.96 
06/1". 74625L24164440982312334 CHLVROH 30301989 DRAPER UT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 51.9C- 1L83.36 
06/11 2433/894^64008822503563 STATE LIQLOK STORE 2 SALT LAKE Ctt DT 
Kirhdra^al Dsb5t C*rd 316.75- 866.31 
06/11 247619741C45C7400C16763 NCVBL TERS WHOLESALE,! SALT LAXS CTT UT 
Withdrawal Debit Cord 797.86- 63.45 
C6/11 247619741645O8O2C013909 STTLRCRAFT SALT LAKE Ct7 DT 
Withdrawal at ATM 1031652 22.00- 46.45 
ATM £ IONS-AIRPORT HRAKCH TERHIKAT. 2 LOWER 
LVL SALT LAKE CTY UT 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 1.00- 45.45 
ATM ZIONS-ATRPORT BilANCE TERKrNAI. 2 LOWER 
LVL SALT LAKE CTY UT 
Withdrawal a: ATM 4C31667 42.30- 3.45 
ATM ZIONS-AIRPORT 3RAMC3 TRRMTNAL 2 LOITER 
LVL SALT LAKE CTY UT 
Withdrawal ATM Tec 1 . CO- 2.4 5 
ATM ZTONS-AJRl'ORT BRANCH TERMINAL 2 LOWER 
LVL SALT LAKE CTY UT 
Withdrawal Adjustment 496.12 496.57 
06/13 74610434L66030182419991 THE HOME DEPOT 4409 SANDY DT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 19.54- 479-03 
06/13 2461C4.74166010L82414815 THE HOME D3POT <409 SAMHY UT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 24.00- 455.03 
06/13 2462512416644C995409415 CHEVRON 00301989 DRAPER UT 
tithdrawal Debit Card 32.94- 422.09 
06/13 246251241664409954O9407 CtLEVRON OC301989 DRAPER UT 
Rnding Balance 422.09 
Dividends Paid Year to Date 0 . CO 





Amount Kumber Amount 
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* r \ i 
J. 75 
pjcuBoxsamas 
& * L * e CS*. I f c * 841 
Ftrone {BO t} 4 * t -8»C* 
eNCUA 
Universii 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
PLEASE fSTUR* I M S POfTTDK WTTH VOJR AAYUBfT OR 
1 9 3 9 6 7 9 
CAMLlLli R- CASTTlLC-JOfcKSON 
3 6 92 DibP *OODS DR. 
DRAPER U: 84020 07/01/04 07/31/04 
0 7/28 
0 7 / 7 9 
07/23 
07/3 L 
7.AKU CIT UT 
*itUdroval ATM Fee 3. DO-
ATM PIOK-KKR PA 300 West 4 00 South SAUT 
LAKE CIT UT 
Withdrawal Debit. Cord 3.9C-
07/28 2445501421C2L042O9728B9
 M j TIEBAA KAftKtT SALT LAKE CIT CT 
Deposit, by Cfteck 60.00 
EndiDg Balance 
Uiviasnds Paid Year tc Date C.85 
5.36 
1 . 16 
61 . 16 
61 .16 






MM. FAYieTTS TO 
PXLBUS8DS 




C R E D I T U N I O N 




r '^£2f s 
t TJTBt 
1 9 3 9 6 7 9 
CAMILLE A. CA3TILLO-JCDN5CN 
1892 DEEP WOODS DK. 
DRAFRH OT 8 4 020 09/C1/34 08/31/04 
08/01 ID 0* 
00/01 
o 8 / :J i 
PRIKB SHARKS Balance Forward 
D e p o a U Dividend Tiered Rate 
Annual Percentage Yield F a m e d 
ending BaLance 
Dividends Fa id tear to Date 
A Tiered Rare Dividend of $0.OL will be posted on 09/01/C4 
G .03 






06/01 ID 90 
03/02 
09/02 
















CHECK.1MG Balance Forxard 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
G7/3L 244550142137.134.23261026 
withdrawal Debit Card 
07/30 244Q36942M9OO421S0GIOS 
withdrawal Debit Card 
G8/01 246 2 5124215.4 413120S2571 
Deposit by C.Neck 
Deposit Transfer 
From CASTILLO, CAJHiLLE 1827 
Withdrawal 
Withdrawal Deb±- Card 
00/07 2462512<2214413523336!»4 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
08/37 24154344221b62925780080 
Withdcaifal at ATM 1020024 
ATM Holiday 0:.l 38 Draper «JT 
Withdrawal ATM Pec 
ATH Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal a- ATH 1636662 
PCS KAVGRIK COIIHTRY STORC 114 
CHAPKR UT 
withdrawal Debit Card 
06/CH 24 62 51 24 7 " 24 4 1 3 6 L 8 08 1 5 8 
Deposit Transfer 
Tror. CASTILLO,CAMILLE 1827 
Withdrawal at ATM *0164J1 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
withdrawal ATM Fee 
7\TM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal at ATH M48066 
V>OS CONOCO 14 4021 MURRAY UT 
Withdrawal at ATM M60731 
Continued on following page — :-
4,92* 
y_l!65>5 HCCCNALD'S MURRAY UT 
30.91-
Br.TMDSIDC StGAKHO'JSE SALT LAKE CTY UT 
1C.23-
CHCVROW 002C5131 SALT r.AKK CTY UT 
4C.00 
220C.0D 
028 Share 90 
3500.00-
40.69-
CEEYRON 0 0205131 SAJ.T LAKE CTY UT 
55.94-




15 S 700 E 
3!i.79-
CHEVROH 00301909 DRAPCR UT 
9000.00 
C28 Share 90 
101.75-
1.00-








































HAM. PArvm€TB TOt 
pjlOnseazs 
S * U*e Oy, Utafc 64 ! SC-OffiS 
ONCUA 
Universii 
C R E D I T U N I O N 
PLEASE RETUm TM5 PORTION WITH YOW l * Y l « r OR O^OSTT. 
1 9 3 9 6 7 9 
CAMTLLB R- CASTILLO-JOHNSON 
1892 3EEP WOODS T)R-
DRAPSR UT 24020 09/01/04 08/31/04 








0 « / 11 

















ATM 7-KLEVHN-U 1 0 9 SOUTH 3 0 0 EAST SALT 
I.AKS C1T CT? 
W i t h d r a w a l A T M F e e 
ATM V-CLrvVrH-U 10D SOOTH 3 0 0 BA.ST SALT 
LAKE CTT UT 
Withdrawal CLARK P. AHSiUCAS 
TY?H: CHK 031DER 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
08/10 2462512472344L365224C96 CRBVROK 002Q319 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
00/09 24625124223441H6816524? CBEVRON 0030198 
withdrawal Debit Card 
09/09 246L0434223010180760806 THE BOME DEPOT 
Withdrawal at ATM 1005997 
ATM Uolxday Oil 38 Diaper DT 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM 8oIiday Oil 38 Draper 0T 
Withdrawal at ATM 1006055 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper C7 
Hil.ndravnil ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Gil 38 Draper UT 
withdrawal D«»hi L Card 
0B/T1 2444500422489182B759826 KENDYS 13445 0.2 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
Oe/Ll 246104342240041218H3734 7-EJLEVEH 26794 
Withdrawal TranjCer 
To CASTCLLO rCAMILLK 1827028 Share 9C 
Withdrawal at ATM 1004451 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper CT 
Withdrawal ATM Fee 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal at ATM I02217L 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal ATK Vee 
ATM Holiday Oil 33 Draper DT 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
08/13 2462512422744L395/75E73 CEEVKOH 0030198 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
00/13 24625124227441395775881 C3EVROK O030198 
withdrawal Debit Card 
Continued on lollowing page 
5 DRAPER UT 






4409 SAKDY UT 


















SALT LAKH CIT UT 
9 DRAWEE DT 
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1 9 3 9 6 7 9 
CAKiLLC R. CASTILLO-JQKHSON 
18 92 DKL'P VOOD5 UK. 
03APCR IT 84020 09/Q1/C4 09/30/C4 
1V / C I 








> 9 / 0 7 
J9/03 
















01 PRIMS SHAKES balance Forward 
Deposit Dividend Tiered Rate 
Aaaual Percentage Yield Earned 
Coding Balance 
Dividends ?3id Year tie Date 
25.03 
0.01 25.04 
0.47% fcoa Oe/Ol/04 through 08/31/04 
25.04 
0.11 
A T i e r e d Rate Div idend of SO.01 w i l l he p o s t e d on 10 /01 /04 
JD 90 CJLKCKLNG B a l a n c e rorward 
D e p o s i t D i v i d e n d T i e r e d Rate 
Annu<*n P e r c e n t a g e Y i e l d Earned 0.2.% from 0 8 / 0 1 / 0 4 
Withdrawal 
STNC RETAIL 439001 SALT LAtCE CI TO 
DATE 08/31/04 24 4 55014 2 4 524 54 7417814 9 5542 
Deposit Traosler 
From CASTILLO. CAMTLIF, 1927028 Shaxe 90 
Draft 000226 






Prom CASTILLO, CAM! .LL.E 182'028 Sfcarft 90 
Draft 0CO227 




Trox CASTILLO, CAM I Lit: 182702B Share 90 
Hxrhdrawal at ATM 1019534 
ATK Holiday Oil 38 Draper UT 
Withdrawal ATM ree 
ATM Holiday Oil 38 Ctapcr 0T 
Withdrawal at ATM fb05J27 
POS SN3TP5 B45 B. 450C SOUT3 SMITHS B*A B. 



















































































»*««. PATVEKTB I C t 
Sa* U M C * * l * A I « 1 nt-OOOS 
ONGUA 
Universi 
C R E D I T U N I O N 





CAMILLE R. CA3T1LLO-J0BHS0N 
16 92 DEEP WOODS F>R -
DRAPER UT 8 4 02D DB/01/04 03/30/04 
0 9/11 
0 3/11 








0 9 / L /. 













Deposit by Chec:** 
Withdrawal at ATM 157 027 5 
PCS LAKAK SCOT? LAMAR SCCTT>'04 
SALT LAKE CIT UT 
*i thd.trawal at ATM 4 136835 
PCS 7-ELEVBN SALT LAKE CI? 3T 
Kithd-awal Adjustment 
0 9 / 1 J 74 154344256554456220033 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
C9/12 24717054256132560417621 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/11 241640"M256€21 114001 101 
withdrawal Debit Card 
09/11 24717054256132562546948 
withdrawal Debit Card 
09/11 24 154344 7.56554458 2200 7 3 




Withdrawal Debit Card 
09/13 24445004256919563215735 
withdrawal Debit Card 
09/14 24399004258142025083304 
Draft 000217 
Ki-hdtayra) Debit Card 
C9/17 2462512426244 1629231319 
Withdrawal Debil. Card 




Withdrawal Debit Card 
03/21 2<492794265-}19000179b53 
Withdrawal Debit Card 
C9/2 1 2462512 42 66 44165469583 0 
Withdrawal Debit C*rd 
09/21 24492794266118000182636 
withdrawal Debit Card 
09/2' 244927942664O9002978562 




2. •; . 
359.18 
K57.59 
5 3 . "' ' 
4 Y O U * C5L.L S 0 G A R H O C S E S A L T L A K E v. 
9.9*-
1CE3KRG DRTVR INK 910 SALT LAKE C .. 
3 0.1 0 
SOUTH POTNT 66004il666 DRAPtR UT 
47.97-
CACO ENTERPRISES 'NC SPLUDX UT 
53.29-
4 YOUR C E L L BUGAR-BOUfiE S A L T LAKX C I T 
2 0 4 . 6 2 -




SMrTHS •-'••'TT f' I. " -i«',:,fi SALT LAKE CIT 
63.70-
WALGREK * • '.'Of • i)j*A'-»Eft UT 
CHEVRON 0 0301 9 >'. 9 DRAPER l)T 
CHEVRON 00301369 DRAPER UT 
5 0 . 0 0 -
3 . 9 2 -
3 5 . 9 L -
4 8 . 2 7 -
I X . 8 2 -
5 8 . 2 3 -
1 0 . 0 0 -
CRTiTtlKY TBEATR 1 2 D 1 9 SAI/T 1AKT. C I T UT 
b . 9 4 -
C K E T R 0 H 0 0 3 0 1 9 8 9 DRAPER UT 
7 , 9 5 -
CENTURY 1 6 1 2 0 1 9 S A L T LAKE UT 
8 . L 8 -
A L B E R T S 0 N 5 1 3 7 9 S 9 K DRAPER UT 
z 0 . 
6 7 . * 
V 
'J 6 2 . ( ' 
5 5 2 . . 
5 0 2 . 
4 4 2 ^ 
% 5 . C 
' 9 -
4 0 . 8 ' 
2 6 . ( 
1 6 7 . 8 4 
1 5 7 . 8 4 
1 5 1 , 9 0 
1 4 3 . 9 5 
2 3 5 . 7 7 
O 
CO 
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V ^ Sprinklers. 
/ 3709West 8140 Soulh, 
West Jordan, Utah. 84088 
Fax# 801-282-1665 
Phone# 801-699-0866 
Owner: Randy Harvey. 
One Year parts and Labor Warranty. 
Bid proposal 
Address 1892 East Deepwoods Dr 
Name: Travis Johnson 
Phone# 801-816-1144 
Job description: Install sprinkler system, topsoil, clean up all trash and 
4eOTis, extend rock wall in front yard and side yard grade and level two tiers 
on North East of property install drip line above rock wall in back yard, reset 
fallen rocks and sod areas specified by owner, set stepping stones on South 
side of property, level sand, and flagstone area near porch. Finished job will 
have dark mulch in all beds over landscape fabric. ^ ^ -• > 
Parts will be purchased from listed retailers. 2£&X^& ^7/C^^^r^ 
ISiarinider supply Co. ^Tj^fy^l^s 
2, B^^mance dirt & Rock. €&&& /***</ 6**S2 < 0 0 
3. Biograss. * J^S^e^xZ&e®- ^© 
Parts & labor estimation:! 15,275.00 * 
Rocks estimated Two loads owner will pay for extra loads @ $1Q00.00 per 
Load. 
Other: $ 
Estimated but not exceeding: Fifteen 
Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-Five Dollars. Exception for rocks. 
This proposal is binding once signed by both parties. 
Payment for proposal will be paid within Twenty- four hours of completion. 
In any case of non payment Home owner will be responsible for all 
reasonable attorney fees and 2% monthly interest * / ^ / / / 7 ^ ^ h 
Contractor. 
Owner or Builder. ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ o ^ ^ ^ Date 
/T7 / /^ 000J24 
ADDENDUM 7 
1 trial. 
2 MR. (?): Your Honor, he was unable to — 
3 THE COURT: Go back. 
4 MR. (?): Do you want to wait? 
5 THE COURT: Oh absolutely. Give him a couple of 
6 glasses of water. We're going to get a drug test and we'll 
7 take however long it takes. He's going to give us a sample. 
8 I've had this trick played before. Fill him with water. 
9 How did you incur your injuries, ma'am? 
10 MS. JOHNSON: I was four and the man we were with, 
11 my mother - it was on the 4th of July and he was inebriated 
12 and she was at a neighbor's house and he'd bought fireworks 
13 and got back in the car and (inaudible) car and we went out 
14 past the railroad tracks, a couple of miles down the road and 
15 he lit some firecrackers and he threw them around the car. 
16 THE COURT: He did what? 
17 MS. JOHNSON: He lit firecrackers and he threw them 
18 around his car. 
19 THE COURT: In the back of the car? 
20 MS. JOHNSON: Yeah, and it ignited it and I was 
21 burned (inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: One of the children died as a result of 
23 that? 
24 MS. JOHNSON: Yeah, he was five. 
25 THE COURT: And you survived with injuries and the 
20 
1 other brother survived without injury? 
2 MS. JOHNSON: Yes. 
3 THE COURT: Forgive me for asking. I was curious 
4 as to how it happened to a child so young. Thank you for 
5 telling me. 
6 (Off the record from 10:13 to 10:18) 
7 THE COURT: -at this time it would be 
8 incriminatory, potentially incriminatory. You have an 
9 attorney and you'll want to consult with your attorney before 
10 you say anything further, or two attorneys. I'm wondering 
11 what effect this has on the trial today. Obviously he's used 
12 two controlled substances and we have no way of ascertaining 
13 when. I can tell you that cocaine and opiates do not remain 
14 in the system like marijuana for any length of time. I have 
15 a sheet that says how long. Opiates, two to three days; 
16 cocaine two to three days. So he could have used it as 
17 recently this morning. He could have used it in the past, 
18 three days ago and I don't know what condition he's in. I 
19 only know that he tests positive and he looked to me like he 
20 was (inaudible) when he walked into the courtroom. 
21 Counsel? 
22 MR. BARKER: Your Honor, I don't know what to say 
23 except to apologize and whatever you would like to do — 
24 THE COURT: You have no need to apologize, counsel. 
25 You had no way of knowing. I have pretty good instincts 
21 
1 about these things and additionally, when someone foregoes 
2 being drug tested for a full year, there's usually a pretty 
3 good reason, i.e. they're using. I don't know if you want to 
4 confer with co-counsel and your client. I don't know that 
5 he's in any shape to proceed and I think there would be a 
6 basis for seeking to overturn anything that happened today in 
7 terms of a verdict but you can certainly talk and I will want 
8 to hear from both sides on this issues. 
9 MR. BARKER: Very good, Your Honor, thank you. 
10 (Off the record from 10:19 to 10:25) 
11 THE COURT: - he's the one who's chemically enhanced 
12 so his judgment is not what I'd call particularly reliable 
13 and I'm concerned that we spend the morning adducing 
14 testimony and he was the first witness that was called and I 
15 don't know when he used. I only that it's in his system and 
16 the petitioner has indicated that she ingested Percocet last 
17 night which is a prescription medication for her burn pain, 
18 the pain related to her burns and that she took it in the 
19 dose required or prescribed but if we were to reset this 
20 matter, she would go without taking her prescribed medication 
21 that she typically takes at night so that she can get some 
22 sleep and I'm of the opinion that I'd like to have a clean 
23 record. I'd like to have these people come to court clean 
24 and proceed in that manner and we can give you a trial as 














































re the mother of Camille? 
I am. 
you were present when she was burned; is that 
I was in the car. 
were you aware that this man had firecrackers 
I knew he had them but I didn't know that he was 
light them. 
And what was he doing, throwing them out the 
He was throwing them out the window and one flew 





back seat of the car and caught the car on 
COURT: You knew he was intoxicated? 
WITNESS: I was riding in the car with someone 







COURT: I said, did you know the man was 
WITNESS: Yes, I did. 
COURT: And you saw him lighting these and 
out the window and knew that there was a 
propensity for them coming back into the vehicle? 
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1 THE WITNESS: This all happened within about 30 
2 seconds. It was a very fast - I had no idea that he was 
3 going to light them. 
4 Q (BY MR. RICHMAN) Address the issue that I left 
5 hanging and botched a little bit. Camille turned age 21 and 
6 got some money and that's what I understand purchased the 
7 house; am I correct? 
8 A When she was 18 she was then - the monthly income 
9 was then turned over to Camille. The trust was for her 
10 medical and schooling and that was managed by the Trust 
11 Department of First National Bank of Alaska which was bought 
12 out by Wells Fargo and they managed the medical part of the 
13 trust. I didn't have anything to do with it. When she 
14 became 25 years old - no, 21 years old, she was then, she 
15 could be in control of half whatever was in the trust at that 
16 time and I believe it was over $500,000. So she had it 
17 taken, she had that half of the trust taken out and invested 
18 with I think it's Fidelity Investments in the town that we're 
19 from, Kenji, Alaska and the manager of that is Parley Giles 
20 and I believe the money for the house came from that and the 
21 reason I know about it is because Camille told me and I also 
22 have Camille's power of attorney and if she needed - I mean, 
23 Parley would also call me if he couldn't get hold of Camille. 
24 Q Let me ask you this. We know that there's a 
25 lifetime annuity and that it has the accelerator to take care 
29 
1 right? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q And that's roughly, do you know how much that is, 
4 $10,000 a month? 
5 A I don't know exactly how much it is. I haven't had 
6 any reason to ask her. 
7 Q The medical surgeries, she had about 60 or 70? 
8 A I would say at least that many. 
9 Q Is that taken out of her trust money and not 
10 reimbursed or does it get reimbursed to her? 
11 A Reimbursed from where? 
12 Q So that's my question, my client led us to believe 
13 that it was money that she was reimbursed for and so I just 
14 want to make sure I'm hearing — 
15 A If she pays for any medical care like going to the 
16 doctor, this was before she was in control of her trust which 
17 she has total control of her trust now that she's 25, before 
18 that what she would do, if she paid for anything, then she 
19 would send the receipts to the bank and then they would 
20 reimburse her that money. 
21 THE COURT: But they're reimbursing her -
22 THE WITNESS: Out of her own money. 
23 THE COURT: - out of her own money. 
24 THE WITNESS: That's her own trust money. It's not 
25 insurance money or - she has no health insurance. 
32 
1 Q (BY MR, BARKER) You probably mentioned this and 
2 I'm sorry I didn't - how much do you believe she has in the 
3 trust at this point right now? 
4 A She has I believe around $500,000. It doesn't go 
5 far in the medical world. 
6 Q But after the 60 surgeries, there's still half a 
7 million in the trust? 
8 A There was a half million dollars in there because -
9 from the time she was 21 is when she got control of half of 
10 her trust and the other half million dollars that's in there, 
11 she hasn't had any surgery in a while. 
12 Q How long has it been since she's had surgery? 
13 A Maybe nine years. She's needed to have it but she 
14 hasn't had it done. She's been here in Utah about six years 
15 and she's never had surgery unless I've been with her. 
16 MR. BARKER: Right. 
17 That's all I have, Your Honor. Thank you. 
18 MR. RICHMAN: I have nothing further. 
19 THE COURT: I just have one question. The man who 
20 did this to her, was he your husband? 
21 THE WITNESS: No. 
22 THE COURT: Your boyfriend? 
23 THE WITNESS: He was at the time. 
24 THE COURT: And what happened to the relationship 
25 after this happened to your daughter? 
33 
1 THE WITNESS: It ended. He was - I testified at 
2 his trial and at every parole hearing that he had, he was 
3 convicted of assault on Camille and he was sentenced to 10 
4 years and he spent 10 years in jail, 
5 THE COURT: It must have been prison, 
6 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: It must have been an aggravated assault 
8 or (inaudible). Okay, thank you, 
9 All right. So we have the testimony on videotape 
10 of the mother of the petitioner and that means she will not 
11 need to return and I appreciate you have to go back to Alaska 
12 and so are there any other problems we've got for setting it 
13 for Tuesday afternoon? 
14 MR. RICHMAN: No, Your Honor, 
15 THE COURT: Okay. We'll see you then. 
16 MR. BARKER: Thank you, Your Honor, 
17 MR. RICHMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 









1 ability with the child? 
2 A Yes, I did. He's never been around young children 
3 before. 
4 Q Can you give me an example of what caused you 
5 concern? The day is late so could we just get a sample? 
6 A Sorry, how he would hold Gabrielle when he was very 
7 young, wouldn't support his head, just basically threw him 
8 over his shoulder, didn't really hold on to him except for 
9 his bottom. He would play with him until Gabrielle cried. I 
10 always had to go and take him away and go play with him and 
11 then Travis would come in and play with him until he cried, 
12 until the child cried but because of Travis playing with him. 
13 Q Let me bounce you to a different subject for a 
14 moment to Travis' car accident and the settlement he got out 
15 of that and let me preface it with this, during anytime that 
16 you've known Travis, have you known him to have hospital, 
17 medical insurance? 
18 A No. 
19 Q And are you able to obtain hospital, medical 
20 insurance? 
21 A Not currently. 
22 Q And do you have significant ongoing medical 
23 expenses? 
24 A Yes, lifelong. 
25 Q You have had more than one surgery. Would you tell 
151 
1 me how may surgeries you've had? 
2 A We don't know, about 80. 
3 Q And do you have any more planned? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q Has this legal case been an impediment to you in 
6 any way? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q For surgery? 
9 A Yes. 
10 I Q And how is that? 
11 A I can't have a surgery if I'm under stress. If I'm 
12 always going to court, I can't have a surgery. I have to be 
13 able to heal and be well enough to have a surgery and I 
14 always get infections and it's kind of a hindrance to have 
15 tissue expanders and go out in public. 
16 Q Let's talk about Travis' surgery. He had some 
17 surgery since you've known him? 
18 A He's had one. 
19 Q And what was that about? 
20 A We were rear-ended in Arizona on the way back from 
21 my grandparents and a car rear-ended us. He got some 
22 vertebrae that were, I'm not sure what happened to them but 
23 he had to go and have bone cartilage from a cadaver put into 
24 his neck. 
25 Q And when did that surgery take place? 
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1 college graduate, right? 
2 A I don't know if I knew. 
3 Q But he wasn't going to school when he was dating 
4 you; isn't that true? 
5 A Correct. 
6 Q And you knew when you married Travis he didn't have 
7 a lot of assets; isn't that correct? 
8 A That's correct. 
9 Q And now briefly again, you've gone over this, I 
10 don't want to belabor it. I just want to go over your 
11 circumstance. You received at least at the time of buying 
12 the house you receive $9,305 per month from one of your 
13 personal injury settlements; is that true? 
14 A Correct. 
15 Q And that money is tax free, right? 
16 A Correct. 
17 Q And you had at the time anyway of your, at the time 
18 you bought the house in February 2003, you had $1 million in 
19 a trust fund, right? 
20 A In a structured trust fund. 
21 Q As a matter of fact, in that document, your net 
22 worth was over $1 million, right, in February 2003? Do you 
23 recall that? I think it's your Exhibit 10 if you want — 
24 THE COURT: How is this relevant? 
25 MR. SCHOFIELD: Your Honor, I think the case law is 
158 
1 and we'll go into this, at the end of a divorce you have to 
2 look at what's equitable for the parties, how they're able to 
3 care for themselves, how they're able to get along, provide 
4 for themselves, 
5 THE COURT: She obviously has assets. 
6 MR, SCHOFIELD: That's all we wanted to hear. 
7 That's all that was, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: I mean, she certainly was never 
9 supported by her husband. 
10 MR. SCHOFIELD: That is true. 
11 Q (BY MR. SCHOFIELD) Well, let me just ask you this, 
12 so you knew Travis' circumstances, you testified to; you knew 
13 you had money coming in but it's true you never had Travis 
14 sign a prenuptial agreement, right? 
15 A Correct. 
16 Q And you did have access to lawyers? 
17 A Correct. 
18 Q And now, after Gabrielle was born on January 1, you 
19 told Travis not to work so he could take care of Gabrielle; 
20 isn't that correct? 
21 A That is not. 
22 Q And Gabrielle is now 3, right? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q And you don't work, isn't that true? 
25 A Correct. 
159 
1 Q And during the marriage you would leave Gabrielle 
2 with Travis for long periods of time while you traveled, 
3 right? 
4 A Incorrect. 
5 MR. SCHOFIELD: Your Honor, may I approach the 
6 witness? 
7 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
8 Q (BY MR. SCHOFIELD) I want to show you your 
9 affidavit here. 
10 THE COURT: May I interject a question? 
11 MR. SCHOFIELD: Yes. 
12 THE COURT: Are you able to work? 
13 THE WITNESS: Not really. I go to school and I go 
14 to Salt Lake Community, not a full course load. I worked one 
15 job in my life and was laid off. 
16 THE COURT: And is that because your hands are 
17 impaired? 
18 THE WITNESS: No, because I'm burned, because I was 
19 working retail and (inaudible) a couple of customers made 
20 remarks. 
21 THE COURT: Okay. 
22 MR. SCHOFIELD: And Your Honor, I think (inaudible) 
23 counsel has an objection. This is her affidavit. I'd just 
24 like to refresh her recollection. 
25 MR. RICHMAN: We do have an objection because it's 
160 
1 Q And you paid cash for the home? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q $168,000, right? 
4 A Correct. 
5 Q And so you were able to pay cash for the home and 
6 still make the mortgage payments on the marital home? 
7 A Correct. 
8 Q And your mother testified last time we were here 
9 that you haven't had a surgery for nine years; is that 
10 correct? 
11 A Roughly, yes. 
12 MR. SCHOFIELD: May I have just one moment, Your 
13 Honor? I think I'm done. 
14 Q (BY MR. SCHOFIELD) I just want to ask you a couple 
15 more questions about I think it's Exhibit 15, your 
16 landscaping exhibit? Okay, and written on the exhibit is a 
17 number, I think it's $7,000, can you see up there, $7,637.50? 
18 A Yes, I see that. 
19 Q Isn't it true that that was taken out of your 
20 personal account on September 15, 2004, that was just four 
21 days after Travis put the $24,000 into your account? 
22 A I don't have paperwork, I don't know. 
23 MR. SCHOFIELD: May I approach the witness, Your 
24 Honor? 
25 THE COURT: Yes. 
167 
1 Q (BY MR. SCHOFIELD) This is (inaudible) right? 
2 A I see that, yes. 
3 Q You see on September 11, $24,000 put in, right? 
4 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
5 Q And then you see here where the $7,637 was taken 
6 out, correct? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Just four days after, right? 
9 A It looks like it. 
10 MR. SCHOFIELD: Your Honor, counsel is correct, my 
11 records here show $7,632.50 and I think her exhibit is 
12 $7,637.50. So I don't know if there's a mistake. 
13 THE COURT: That doesn't matter. I've got one that 
14 says $76 and I can't tell if it's a 5 or 3 and then seven and 
15 then 50 cents. 
16 MR. SCHOFIELD: Your Honor, I think that's all I 
17 have, Your Honor. Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Anything further? 
19 MR. RICHMAN: No, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: You do need surgery; is that correct? 
21 THE WITNESS: Yes (inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: Is it painful as a result of the 
23 surgery that you need? 
24 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
25 THE COURT: The skin is tightened? 
168 
1 THE WITNESS: The skin is (inaudible). 
2 THE COURT: So you need to have all of that 
3 surgically handled? 
4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: And we're talking about a number of 
6 different surgeries? 
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
8 THE COURT: All right, thank you. 
9 Are you calling any other witnesses? 
10 MR. RICHMAN: We are not, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: You're resting? 
12 MR. RICHMAN: With the exception of the attorney's 
13 fees. 
14 THE COURT: Well, we're going to leave that for 
15 another day. We've run out of time. What have you got? 
16 MR. SCHOFIELD: We have Pamela Johnson, his mother 
17 which I'll ask three questions too and then we have the 
18 sister who will be very brief. I don't know if you want to 
19 do it now or come back, whatever you want to do. 
20 THE COURT: Let's get the two witnesses on. 
21 MR. SCHOFIELD: Pamela Johnson Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: I'm going to hold you to it. 
23 (Both talking) 
24 MR. SCHOFIELD: We'll do it. 
25 MR. RICHMAN: I'd just observe, while they're 
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